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CHALLENGING THE ADVERSARIAL
APPROACH TO TAXPAYER
REPRESENTATION
Loren D. Prescott, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Each year U.S. taxpayers prepare and file tax returns with the
federal government which summarize information that serves as
the basis for the assessment of federal income tax. Because ours is
a self-assessment system, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must
examine returns as part of an effort to ensure that all taxpayers are
complying with the internal revenue laws. Naturally, taxpayers are
motivated to report transactions in a way that minimizes tax liabil-
ity. Equally important to taxpayers, however, is a return that
minimizes the likelihood of examination, given the time and ex-
pense associated with IRS audits and the much publicized concern
over IRS abuse of taxpayer rights. The conflict between the gov-
ernment's need for information and the taxpayer's interest in
minimizing both tax liability and disclosure creates an adversarial
relationship between the IRS and taxpayers that threatens gov-
ernmental efforts to test for taxpayer compliance.
The adversarial nature of the tax compliance process is, in
part, a product of the way in which the legal profession has charac-
terized taxpayer interaction with the IRS. In ethics opinions is-
sued for the purpose of defining the role of the lawyer as taxpayer
representative, the profession takes the position that the tax
compliance process involves a dispute between two adversaries-
the taxpayer and the IRS-and should be treated as an adversarial
proceeding warranting partisan advocacy on the part of the tax-
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payer's lawyer.'
Although adoption of the adversary model in this setting is
consistent with both taxpayer attitudes toward the compliance sys-
tem and with the traditional duties assumed by the lawyer during
representation of a client, it fails to consider fundamental differ-
ences between the return preparation and examination process
and traditional adversary proceedings. In addition, the refusal of
one party to volunteer information to another, a trademark of ad-
versary proceedings, poses a serious threat to governmental efforts
to promote taxpayer compliance.
This Article begins with a description of the adversary system
and its use in the traditional dispute resolution setting. It then
explores the use of the adversary system as a vehicle for resolving
disputes between taxpayers and the IRS and suggests that use of
the adversary system in this context is both theoretically inappro-
priate and practically inconsistent with societal, interests.3 This
Article concludes with a proposal designed to address the most se-
rious problem associated with the use of the adversary model in
this context: inadequate disclosure of information on tax returns.
II. THE ADVERSARY MODEL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The adversary model is characterized primarily by the use of
an impartial and passive decision-maker.5 This decision-maker-
the judge, jury, or both, in the trial setting-considers the evidence
presented by the parties and resolves the dispute by rendering a
decision based solely on information obtained from the parties.
The decision-maker's impartiality creates a sense of fairness, which
encourages the parties and society in general to respect judicial
1. See infra Part III.
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1981)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE] (stating that the advocate's preparation and presentation
allows the tribunal to keep an open mind and render impartial decisions); id. EC 7-
20 (stating that the adjudicative process requires an informed, impartial tribunal); id.
EC 7-33 (positing the goal of the legal system as the adjudication of cases before im-
partial tribunals); id. EC 7-39 (recognizing the importance of preserving the impar-
tiality of the tribunal); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 564 (1986)
(stating that judge and jury are both neutral and passive); Murray L. Schwartz, The
Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'
ETHIcS 150, 153 (D. Luban ed., 1973) [hereinafter Schwartz, Zeal] (describing the
adversarial tribunal as unbiased and passive).
[Vol. 30:693
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decisions.6 In addition, neutrality distinguishes the adversary
model from a commonly used alternative-the inquisitorial sys-
tem-by minimizing concerns associated with governmental influ-
ence over decisions.
In addition to being neutral, the decision-maker in an adver-
sarial proceeding is also passive.9 In the litigation setting the fact
6. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers,
66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 672, 674 (1978) [hereinafter Schwartz, Professionalism] (stating
that the presence of an impartial arbiter promotes fairness by assuring that there is only
one party responsible for reaching the correct decision); see also Lon L. Fuller & John
D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J.
1159, 1161 (1958) (stating that without neutrality, the trial may become "a ritual de-
signed to provide public confirmation for what the tribunal considers it has already
established in private"). Fuller and Randall suggest that without the benefit of parti-
san advocacy, the decision-maker is forced into the role of representative for each
party and is thereby unable to maintain the level of objectivity necessary to identify
the truth. See id. at 1160. But see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 71-72
(1988) (challenging the position taken by Fuller and Randall by suggesting that fair-
ness does not depend on the adequate representation of each party's position).
7. Professor Stephan Landsman describes the inquisitorial approach as a process
centered around the role of the judge:
It is his duty to investigate the facts and interrogate the witnesses as well as
to formulate the decision. The .entire adjudicatory process revolves around
the judge. Because he is so important, lay juries are not favored. For the
same reason party control of the proceedings is minimized. Generally, the
parties initiate the proceedings and participate in the inquiry, but they are
never allowed to control the fact-gathering process. Lawyers play a far less
important role than they do in the adversary system. As one might expect,
the inquisitorial process is firmly committed to the search for material truth.
STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 49
(1984); see also GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120
(1978) (stating that countries with civil law tradition use the inquisitorial system); Ellen
E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J.
301,314 (1989) (explaining that much of the world uses the inquisitorial system).
8. See LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 46 ("The prospects for sympathetic hearing
are increased [in adversary proceedings] because the judge and, to an even greater ex-
tent, the jury are beyond governmental control and cannot be taken to task for their
decisions."); cf. Edmund Byrne, The Adversary System: Who Needs It?, in ETHICS
AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 204, 213 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds.,
1986) (stating that inquisitorial systems do not provide a government-free forum for
resolution of disputes). Professor Landsman concludes that the use of appointed
judges to serve in the European inquisitorial systems ultimately led to rejection of
the inquisitorial model in this country:
Generally, the inquisitorial process will not serve as a check on government
power. Inquisitorial judges (at least throughout Europe) are bureaucratswho identify with the government and whose advancement in the judicial
hierarchy depends on accommodation rather than confrontation ... Ad-
vancement in the bureaucracy is not won by creative activity but rather by
conformity to the rules of the 
organization.
LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 50.
9. See WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at 564 (describing the judge and jury as neutral
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finder considers only the issues and evidence presented by the
parties and has little opportunity to explore the issues outside the
scope of the debate. '° Insistence on passivity follows from the the-
ory advanced by some scholars that an active decision-maker for-
mulates theories and conclusions prematurely and is therefore un-
able to consider all evidence objectively.1 Advocates of passivity
also argue that it provides the decision-maker with the opportunity
to benefit fully from the partisan arguments advanced by the par-
ties.12 These scholars contend that, unlike judges in the inquisito-
and passive); Schwartz, Zeal, supra note 5, at 153 (describing the adversarial tribunal
as unbiased and passive).
10. Professor Landsman states:
If the lawyers fail to carry out their duty, development of the case will be
impeded, and the adversary process may be undermined. Failure of coun-
sel may also draw the judge into the contest either in search of material
truth or in an attempt to ensure a balanced presentation. In either situa-
tion, judicial intervention can interfere with the neutral evaluation of the
case.
LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 4.
11. See HAZARD, supra note 7, at 121 (stating that the adversary system is char-
acteristic of trial procedures in common law countries); LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at
49 ("[T]he inquiring judge [in an inquisitorial system] is more likely to act upon his
biases than is his adversarial counterpart."); Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAw 34 (H. Berman ed., 2d ed. 1971) ("An adversary presen-
tation seems the only effective means for combating this natural human tendency to
judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The ar-
guments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposing
interpretations of it."); Fuller & Randall, supra note 6, at 1160 ("But what starts as a
preliminary diagnosis designed to direct the inquiry tends, quickly and impercepti-
bly, to become a fixed conclusion, as all that confirms the diagnosis makes a strong
imprint on the mind, while all that runs counter to it is received with diverted atten-
tion."). But see LUBAN, supra note 6, at 72 (describing conclusions about an inquisi-
torial judge's inability to remain unbiased as "untested speculations from the arm-
chair").
12. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4
(1975) (stating that the adversary system not only takes the fact of disagreement into
account but takes advantage of it to produce a judgment informed by contrasting
points of view); Byrne, supra note 8, at 204 ("For there are two sides to every ques-
tion, so the best way to get to an answer is by arguing each side before an impartial
and, insofar as possible, enlightened arbiter of fact and law."); Fuller, supra note 11,
at 35 ("The judge cannot know how strong an argument is until he has heard it from
the lips of one who has dedicated all the powers of his mind to its formulation.");
Fuller & Randall, supra note 6, at 1161 (stating that the decision-maker can feel
confident in making the correct decision only with the benefit of the "intelligent and
vigorous advocacy on both sides" offered by the adversary mode). But see Marvin E.
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1042
(1975) [hereinafter Frankel, Search]. Frankel states:
The ignorance and unpreparedness of the judge are intended axioms of the
system. The "facts" are to be found and asserted by the contestants. The
judge is not to have investigated or explored the evidence before trial. No
one is to have done it for him .... Without an investigative file, the Ameri-
[Vol. 30:693
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rial system, 3 the passive and impartial decision-maker of the ad-
versary system is more likely to render a correct decision due to
the unbiased and detached mindset encouraged by the system.
14
Active party participation and control, the other major feature
of the adversary system, serves as both a corollary of the system's
insistence on a passive and impartial decision-maker and as a fea-
ture of independent importance.'5 Motivated by a desire to prevail
and benefiting from a unique knowledge of the facts surrounding
the dispute, the. parties engage in a thorough investigation and,
with the assistance of counsel, prepare and present a case in sup-
port of their respective positions.! The result is a party-centered
can trial judge is a blind and blundering intruder, acting in spasms as sud-
den flashes of seeming light may lead or mislead him at odd times.
Id.
13. See Professor Landsman's description of the inquisitorial system, supra note
7. See also HAZARD, supra note 7, at 120 (stating that the judge in an inquisitorial
system determines law and finds facts by his own active investigation and inquiries).
14. See Robert J. Kutak, The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 5, at 174 (arguing that use of the adversary system will
lead to a greater number of correct results than the inquisitorial system). But see
Fuller, supra note 11, at 45 (stating that the adversarial system alone is not sufficient
to guarantee correct results). Fuller states:
If that participation [by the party] is to be meaningful it must take place
within an orderly frame, and it is the duty of the judge to see to it that the
trial does not degenerate into a disorderly contest in which 'the essential is-
sues are lost from view. Furthermore, when the party is given through his
attorney an opportunity to present arguments, this opportunity loses its
value if argument has to be directed into a vacuum. To argue his case ef-
fectively, the lawyer must have some idea of what is going on inside the
judge's mind. A more active participation by the judge-assuming it stops
short of a prejudgment of the case itself-can therefore enhance the
meaning and effectiveness of an adversary presentation.
Id.
15. See LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 44.
Adversary theory holds that if a party is intimately involved in the adjudica-
tory process and feels that he has been given a fair opportunity to present
his case, he is likely to accept the results whether favorable or not. Assum-
ing this theory is correct, the adversa y process will serve to reduce post-
litigation friction and to increase compliance with judicial mandates.
Id.; see also Schwartz, Zeal, supra note 5, at 153 (stating that party control is a neces-
sary consequence of a passive tribunal).
16. See HAZARD, supra note 7, at 120; LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 24-25. Par-
ticipation also furthers the goal of respecting and preserving the dignity of the individ-
ual by preliminarily acknowledging the legitimacy of a party's claim and providing the
party with an opportunity to present the position for consideration in an adjudicatory
setting. See Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE
GOOD LAWYER, supra note 5, at 130 (arguing that provisional acceptance of a posi-
tion advanced as legitimate preserves the dignity of the individual); Schwartz, Zeal,
supra note 5, at 154-55 ("[Plersons involved either voluntarily or involuntarily in an
adjudicatory system are entitled, as a matter of self-realization, to untrammeled
freedom to present their causes."); Sward, supra note 7, at 310 (discussing the need
January 19971
698 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:693
and contentious proceeding17 in which each side presents the
strongest possible case through argument, the introduction of evi-
dence, and challenges to evidence introduced by the opponent.'8
In theory, active party participation promotes proper identifi-
cation and clarification of the issues, thorough investigation of the
relevant facts, and forceful presentation of a party's position. 9
to give litigants the fullest voice possible to preserve individual dignity).
17. See Sward, supra note 7, at 302 n.3 (describing the contentious nature of the
adversary system); see also Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 738-39 (1906) (stating that the
American system uses judges as umpires to regulate a game between opposing coun-
sel).
The idea that procedure must of necessity be wholly contentious disfigures
our judicial administration at every point. It leads the most conscientious
judge to feel that he is merely to decide the contest, as counsel present it,
according to the rules of the game, not to search independently for truth
and justice. It leads counsel to forget that they are officers of the court and
to deal with the rules of law and procedure exactly as the professional foot-
ball coach with the rules of the sport. It leads to exertion to "get error into
the record," rather than to dispose of the controversy finally and upon its
merits. It turns witnesses, and especially expert witnesses, into partisans
pure and simple. It leads to sensational cross-examinations "to affect
credit," which have made the witness stand "the slaughter house of reputa-
tions." It prevents the trial court from restraining the bullying of witnesses,
and creates a general dislike, if not fear, of the witness-function, which im-
pairs the administration of justice.
Id. (citation omitted).
18. See FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 9 (discussing the strongest possible case
presented by each side); LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 21-22 (challenging evidence
introduced by the opponent-primarily through cross-examination and the use of
affidavits-and developed as a means of protecting the neutral decision-maker from
prejudicial evidence introduced by those willing to abuse the party control feature of
the adversary system); Schwartz, Zeal, supra note 5, at 153 (stating that "the parties
have the responsibility of prosecuting and presenting their own best cases").
19. See HAZARD, supra note 7, at 128 ("[T]he primary benefit of the [adversary]
system is often said to be the promotion of truth."); Byrne, supra note 8, at 204
(stating that the adversary system is "the greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth") (quoting 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF
COMMON LAW 1367 (1923)); Marvin E. Frankel, The Conflict Between Self Interest
and Justice, 16 JUDGE'S J., at 8, 10 (1977) [hereinafter Frankel, Conflict] ("'The very
premise of our adversary system ... is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case
will best promote' the ascertainment of truth and right results." (citing Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975))). According to Landsman:
The judicial process is generally used to satisfy two objectives: first, the
search for truth, and second, the resolution of disputes between contending
parties. Although most court systems seek to accomplish both these goals,
the procedural mechanisms best suited to the achievement of each are dif-
ferent. Where judges are assigned an active, inquisitorial part in the litiga-
tion process, they will be expected to undertake an uninhibited search for
truth. Perhaps the best examples of this approach are to be found in the
justice systems of the Socialist states of Eastern Europe. Where judges are
assigned a neutral and passive function, however, they will, in all likelihood,
be expected to devote their energies to resolving the disputes framed by the
TAXPAYER REPRESENTATION
Collectively, these features are intended to ensure that the deci-
sion-maker will be fully apprised of all relevant factual informa-
tion before making a decision.2 In practice, however, the benefits
anticipated from party participation are often unrealized. The an-
tagonistic nature of the system encourages the parties to present
only that information which supports their respective positions; the
competitive approach adopted by the parties as a necessary ad-
junct to an adversary proceeding eliminates any incentive to coop-
erate in assembling the complete factual record, which the deci-
sion-maker needs for a proper resolution of the dispute.2' As a
result, parties handicap their opponents by selectively withholding
information acquired during preparation of the case.
The resulting problem with access to information is addressed,
in part, by the rules of discovery and burdens of proof24 designed
litigants. The American adversary system has traditionally accepted the lat-
ter approach and thereby favored the goal of resolving disputes.
LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 3.
20. See LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 37-38 (commenting that through party con-
trol, the adversary system encourages full examination of the evidence by the party
that finds itself at a "factual disadvantage"). Professor Landsman also observes that
party participation and control ensures that the result obtained will suit the parties
involved, thereby avoiding "impositional costs." See id at 38; see also HAZARD, su-
pra note 7, at 121 (commenting on the importance of party participation to the indi-
vidual involved in the proceeding); WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at 568 (commenting on
how voting fosters citizen participation).
21. See LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 37-38 (suggesting that parties may gather
and introduce information selectively); Sward, supra note 7, at 302 (stating that ad-
versarial fact-finding is one of the major weaknesses of the adversary system); see
also KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF
ATrORNEYs AT WORK 241-42 (1985) (describing the importance of "information con-
trol" in both criminal and civil litigation); Schwartz, Professionalism, supra note 6, at
677 ("Putting one's best foot forward by stepping on the feet of the other side makes
sense because of the presence of an impartial arbiter.").
22. See Alex Wilson Albright, The Texas Discovery Privileges: A Fool's Game?,
70 TEx. L. REV. 781, 785 (1992) ("The adversary system creates incentives ... to
keep the results of investigations confidential to prevent any benefit from accruing to
the opponent."); Kutak, supra note 14, at 175 (acknowledging the right of parties to
withhold information from opponents and, in some circumstances, to misrepresent
the facts); Sward, supra note 7, at 317 ("[A]dversarial adjudication encourages peo-
ple actively to cover up facts that could lead to a more accurate portrayal of truth
.... In theory, discovery rules are supposed to alleviate this problem.").
23. See Frankel, Search, supra note 12, at 1054 (addressing "our rigid insistence
that the parties control the evidence until it is all 'prepared' and packaged for com-
petitive manipulation"); Sward, supra note 7, at 327 (commenting that the use of dis-
covery devices represents a modification in the adversary system designed to provide
equal access to information). See generally FED. R. CIv. P. 26 (mandating voluntary
disclosure of information by parties in federal court proceedings).
24. See Kutak, supra note 14, at 177 (explaining that procedural rules, including
the right of cross-examination and distribution of burdens of proof, help to ensure that
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to minimize the negative impact of partisan behavior.2 Neverthe-
less, abuse of the discovery process, 26 differences in the resources
and abilities of the parties, and the natural reluctance of one
party to assist the other raise questions about the ability of the ad-
versary system to provide all parties with a fair forum for the
resolution of disputes.2
The legal profession is an essential part of the adversary sys-
tem. 29 The lawyer assists clients in accessing the legal system by
identifying legal claims, gathering evidence, preparing a case for
trial, and advocating on behalf of the client's position during an
adversarial proceeding. Undoubtedly it is the role of the lawyer as
facts will be assessed properly and the result will be correct).
25. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 6, at 1216 ("Partisan advocacy finds its jus-
tification in the contribution it makes to a sound and informed disposition of contro-
versies. Where this contribution is lacking, the partisan position permitted to the ad-
vocate loses its reason for being.").
26. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 51.
The rules of discovery, initiated to enable one side to find out crucial facts
from the other, are used nowadays to delay trial or to impose added ex-
penses on the other side; conversely, one might respond to an interrogatory
by delivering to the discoverer tons of miscellaneous documents to run up
their legal bills or to conceal a needle in a haystack.
Id; see also Sward, supra note 7, at 317 (stating that discovery has become a "weapon
in the adversary arsenal").
27. See WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at 568 (stating that imbalance in resources cre-
ates unfairness); Frankel, Conflict, supra note 19, at 10 ("A deeply inherent flaw [in
the adversary system] is the mismatching of the contestants. The unequal resources
of clients and (frequently corresponding) inequalities in the skills of their lawyers
blight the vision of a fairly balanced contest."). On this subject Professor Schwartz
stated, "Because only in rare cases will the parties be equal in their presentation
ability, it is not possible to reach the even-handedness of an impartial tribunal
charged with the prosecution and presentation functions. Nevertheless, it is critical
that the imbalance be reduced as much as possible. .. ." Schwartz, Zeal, supra note
5, at 153-54. Professor Schwartz concludes that this imbalance is best minimized by
utilizing advocates roughly equal in ability and commitment to client objectives. See
id.
28. Commentators have suggested that adversarial dispute resolution is inappro-
priate in some circumstances. See LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 52 (stating it is inap-
propriate when the parties must continue to interact, as in the case of disputes be-
tween family members or between labor and management, and in situations not
involving disputes, such as name changes, adoption, and uncontested divorce);
Byrne, supra note 8, at 210 (stating it is inappropriate for intercorporate disputes,
situations not involving disputes-including decisions involving the health care of
family members-and consumer complaints); Sward, supra note 7, at 318 (stating it is
inappropriate in situations not involving disputes).
29. See LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that the adversary system has come
to rely on "a class of skilled professional advocates to assemble and to present the
testimony upon which decisions will be based."); Fuller & Randall, supra note 6, at
1160 ("Without the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of the
parties, this essential narrowing of the issues becomes impossible.").
[Vol. 30:693
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client advocate, together with the importance lawyers place on vic-
tory, that explains the legal profession's commitment to the adver-
sary model and. its reluctance to participate in addressing the
problems associated with adversarial dispute resolution.0
The lawyer's ethical duty of loyalty to the client creates an
obligation to represent the client's interests "zealously within the
bounds of the law."'" The object of this duty is to maximize the
likelihood that the client will prevail.32 In the context of an adver-
sarial proceeding, the lawyer is free to pursue the objectives of the
client, confident that partisan advocacy will benefit the decision-
maker without prejudicing the rights of others.3 3 Lesser but
equally important ethical duties owed to others impose a duty of
honesty on the lawyer35 and an obligation to disclose information
30. See HAZARD, supra note 7, at 128 (stating that the use of a partisan advocate
inhibits the search for truth); Frankel, Conflict, supra note 19, at 10 (suggesting that
the "quality of diminished adversariness" found in small claims court is due to the
absence of lawyers).
31. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his
client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of
the law .... "); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.3 cmt. 1
(1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] ("A lawyer should act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf."); LUBAN, supra note 6, at 57 ("The duty of a lawyer in an adversary pro-
ceeding is therefore one-sided partisan zeal in advocating her client's position.").
32. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-23 ("The adversary system contem-
plates that each lawyer will present and argue the existing law in the light most fa-
vorable to his client."); LUBAN, supra note 6, at 11 ("When acting as an advocate, a
lawyer must, within the established constraints on professional behavior, maximize
the likelihood that the client will prevail."); Fuller & Randall, supra note 6, at 1161
(stating that the advocate presents the case in a manner most favorable to the client);
see also Schwartz, Zeal, supra note 5, at 150 (describing the obligation to maximize
the likelihood of client success as the "Duty of Professionalism").
33. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, pmbl. § 7 ("[W]hen an opposing party is
well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the
same time assume that justice is being done."); Schwartz, Professionalism, supra note
6, at 677 ("Lawyers are justified in using methods and seeking results with which
they may personally disagree because of faith in the ability of the arbiter to reach a
correct decision."); see also LUBAN, supra note 6, at 12 n.1 (stating the assumption
that "partisanship" and "nonaccountability" represent lawyers' ethics).
34. See LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 5 ("Since the rough-and-tumble of adversary
procedure exacerbates the natural tendency of advocates to seek to win by any means
available, the adversary system employs rules of ethics to control the behavior of coun-
sel.").
35. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 7-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from
knowingly making a false statement of fact or law); MODEL RULES, supra note 31,
Rule 4.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of fact or
law); see also Kutak, supra note 14, at 175 ("IT]he adversary system assumes basic
honesty among its participants.").
January 1997]
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in very limited situations.36 Generally, however, the lawyer's pri-
mary obligation centers on the duty of loyalty to the client.3 ' Con-
sistent with that duty, the lawyer usually withholds unsolicited in-
formation and other assistance from opponents in the interest of
promoting client objectives. 8 The adversary system sanctions the
lawyer's attitude of indifference to the interests and objectives of
the opponent.
A number of conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of
the adversary system. First, the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the cli-
ent is an integral and essential part of the adversary system. Sec-
ond, the adversary system permits the ethical duty of loyalty to
manifest itself in the form of partisan advocacy. Conduct typically
found in adversarial proceedings-contentiousness, nondisclosure,
abuse of the discovery process, to name a few4 -- admittedly
prejudices the rights of others in some circumstances. Nonethe-
36. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 4.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from
knowingly failing to disclose a material fact when necessary to prevent a criminal or
fraudulent act); Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 7-102(A)(3) (stating that a law-
yer shall not "[c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law
to reveal.").
37. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 5-1. The Model Code states:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromis-
ing influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of
other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute
his loyalty to his client.
Id. (footnote omitted).
38. See MANN, supra note 21, at 155 ("For the defense attorney, winning almost
always entails helping the client to conceal facts."); Albright, supra note 22, at 785
(stating that the adversary system encourages advocates to keep investigative results
from opponents); Kutak, supra note 14, at 174-76 (noting that there is no obligation
to volunteer information). But because the duty of fairness owed to the opponent
contemplates that the parties and their lawyers will answer all questions honestly, see
supra note 35 and accompanying text, the ability to ask the right questions will de-
termine the level of honesty received. See Kutak, supra note 14, at 175. But see FED.
R. Civ. P. 26 (imposing a duty on parties in federal court proceedings to disclose
relevant information voluntarily).
39. See Kutak, supra note 14, at 182 ("A lawyer is not required to share his or
her competence with others and may be indifferent to the incompetence of an adver-
sary."). See generally Schwartz, Professionalism, supra note 6, at 673 (discussing the
"Principle of Nonaccountability"). Professor Schwartz defines the responsibilities of
the advocate in the form of the Principles of Professionalism and Nonaccountability.
Noting first that the Principle of Professionalism requires the lawyer to maximize the
likelihood that the client will prevail, he proceeds with the questions of accountabil-
ity by observing that "[w]hen acting as an advocate for a client according to the
Principle of Professionalism, a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor morally
accountable for the means used or the ends achieved." Id.
40. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
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less, adversarial proceedings tolerate such partisan behavior be-
cause the prejudicial effects of partisanship are addressed by party
participation and procedural rules, leaving the decision-maker and
the parties in a position to benefit from partisanship without con-
cern over its negative effects.4' Thus, partisan advocacy is a prod-
uct of, and is justified by, its role in adversarial proceedings.
This relationship between partisan behavior and adversarial
proceedings raises a serious question about the need for limits on
the use of partisanship in other dispute resolution settings. If
partisan advocacy is truly an element of the adversary system, how
can a lawyer's partisan advocacy be justified when representing a
client outside of traditional adversary proceedings? Lawyers per-
form a wide variety of tasks and serve clients in a number of dif-
ferent roles. Can the use of partisan advocacy be justified in rep-
resentational settings that are not, or not wholly, adversarial?
Admittedly, the nature of a particular representational setting may
justify the use of partisan advocacy.43 In all cases, however, use of
the partisan approach to dispute resolution embraced by the ad-
versary system must be justified, both in terms of benefits provided
and detriments controlled.
Confusion surrounding the use of partisan advocacy by the
lawyer outside of the typical courtroom setting is largely the result
of the legal profession's failure to address adequately the duties of
lawyers when serving as advisor or as advocate outside of a tradi-
tional adversarial proceeding. The legal profession's rules of pro-
fessional conduct now acknowledge the varied roles played by a
41. See WOLFRAM, supra note 5, at 566 (observing that the truth is revealed
through the evaluation of positions by others and concluding that the fact-finder is
best able to determine the truth by witnessing this "reciprocating process of proof
and challenge to proof"). But see LUBAN, supra note 6, at 71 (speculating that the
adversarial process will not always eliminate "non-facts").
42. See generally Frankel, Search, supra note 12 (suggesting alternatives to the
adversary system); Nathan L. Posner, Truth, Justice and the Client's Interest. Can the
Lawyer Serve All Three, 60 JUDICATURE 111, 111 (1976) (suggesting that
"[a]dversary procedures must be amended and altered if we seek a better determi-
nation of where the truth lies").
43. In many cases the objectives of the parties provide the incentive necessary to
encourage the parties to self-police, thereby minimizing the negative impact of parti-
sanship. For example, lawyers frequently assume the role of advocate when repre-
senting clients involved in negotiations unrelated to an adversary proceeding. See
infra note 170 and accompanying text for a discussion of this use of partisan advo-
cacy. In other cases, however, unequal bargaining positions and the absence of an
incentive to cooperate create a situation in which partisan advocacy simply enhances
the disadvantage already imposed on one party. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 68-70.
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lawyer in the course of representing a client" and make some at-
tempt to distinguish the duties of the advocate from those of the
lawyer when serving in nonadvocate roles. 45 With the sinfle ex-
ception of the treatment afforded the role of intermediary,' how-
ever, these rules fail to identify roles in which the use of partisan
advocacy is both inappropriate and unjustified. This leaves mem-
bers of the profession with the impression that the ethical duty of
loyalty contemplates the use of partisan advocacy in all represen-
tational settings.47
The failure of the profession's ethics rules to address the
unique nature of federal income tax practice has prompted consid-
erable debate over both the role of the lawyer as taxpayer repre-
sentative and the nature of the federal tax return preparation and
examination process.4 8 The tax return preparation and examina-
tion process is significantly different than a traditional adversary
proceeding: the return preparation process is conducted without
adversarial input49 and the taxpayer's opponent is a governmental
agency responsible for representing society's interest in promoting
44. Following an initial description of the lawyer as client representative, officer
of the legal system, and public citizen, the preamble to the Model Rules identifies
five distinct roles played by the lawyer as client representative: advisor, advocate,
negotiator, intermediary, and evaluator. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, pmbl.; cf.
Schwartz, Zeal, supra note 5, at 671 (distinguishing between the lawyer as advocate
and nonadvocate in an article published five years before completion of the ABA
Model Rules). Previous efforts of the profession to define the ethical duties of its
members addressed only the role of the lawyer as advocate. See WOLFRAM, supra
note 5, at 689 ("The 1908 Canons of Ethics and the 1969 Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility gave little attention to nonlitigation functions of lawyers."); Harry A.
Blackmun, Thoughts About Ethics, 24 EMORY L.J. 1, 12 (1975) ("[B]oth the old Can-
ons and the new Code primarily concern the lawyer only as a party in the adversary
process.").
45. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rules 2.1-2.3 (dealing with the law-
yer as advisor, intermediary, and evaluator) with id. Rules 3.1-3.9 (forwarding the
lawyer as advocate).
46. See Louis M. Brown & Edward A. Dauer, Professional Responsibility in
Nonadversarial Lawyering: A Review of the Model Rules, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
1. 519, 524 (praising the drafters of the Model Rules for adopting in Rule 2.2 a
nonadversarial approach to the representation of clients by having the lawyer serve
as intermediary).
47. The Model Rules seem to confirm the profession's approval of traditional ad-
vocacy outside of adversarial proceedings by imposing the duties of the advocate on
the lawyer serving as advocate in nonadjudicative proceedings. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 31, Rule 3.9.
48. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
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taxpayer compliance.50 Nevertheless, the legal profession charac-
terizes the tax compliance process as adversarial, a conclusion used
by lawyers to justify the use of partisan advocacy on behalf of cli-
ents during the preparation and subsequent examination of re-
turns.-"
III. THE LAWYER AS THE TAXPAYER REPRESENTATIVE
The tax lawyer serves taxpayers as both advisor and advo-
cate.52 As advisor, the lawyer assists taxpayers in evaluating the
tax consequences of past and proposed transactions, recommends
reporting positions in keeping with the taxpayer's natural objective
of minimizing tax liability, counsels taxpayers on the manner in
which information must be disclosed to the IRS, and advises on the
possible imposition of penalties relating to both the positions
taken and to adequate disclosure of those positions on the return.53
As advocate, the lawyer represents the interests of taxpayers dur-
ing the audit and administrative appeals process conducted by the
IRS, and when necessary, in subsequent judicial appeals. Al-
though the issues raised by the use of partisan advocacy outside of
traditional adversary proceedings relate to representation of tax-
payers in all but the judicial settingf 4 the scope of this Article is
50. See generally infra Parts II.A-B. (explaining the proper role of an attorney in
preparation and examination of the tax return).
51. See infra Part III.
52. Cf. Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique
of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAx LAw. 643, 645-46 (1986) (identifying seven
roles of the tax lawyer: tax planning advisor, taxpayer, tax return advisor, tax shelter
advisor, tax return preparer, advocate in an adversary proceeding and lobbyist).
53. The lawyer may also serve as tax return preparer. For a discussion of the
duties of the lawyer as return preparer, see infra notes 126-31 and accompanying
text.
54. Consideration of the lawyer's role as taxpayer advocate in administrative ap-
peals before the IRS and in litigation and judicial appeals is beyond the scope of this
Article. On the subject of adversarial representation of clients, it is worth noting that
not all commentators agree on the use of partisan advocacy by lawyers when repre-
senting clients in the traditional litigation setting. Compare FREEDMAN, supra note
12, at 5 (arguing that partisan advocacy is fundamental to the adversarial system)
and Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (arguing that the use of partisan advo-
cacy is a requirement of the system of justice) and Fuller & Randall, supra note 6, at
1160 ("It is only through the advocate's participation that the hearing may remain
... a public trial of the facts and issues.") with LUBAN, supra note 6, at 60-63
(acknowledging the distinction between criminal and civil proceedings and the use of
partisan advocacy in criminal cases as a means of furthering the goal of curtailing the
power of the state over its citizens) and Schwartz, Zeal, supra note 5, at 160
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limited to an examination of the tax compliance process and the
lawyer's role as taxpayer representative, and more specifically, to
the preparation of the tax return and its subsequent examination
by the IRS.5s
A. Preparation of the Tax Return
The process of preparing and filing the annual income tax re-
turn includes both a consideration of the tax consequences associ-
ated with financial transactions engaged in by the taxpayer during
the year and an evaluation of the need to report information relat-
ing to those transactions on the return. The lawyer retained to as-
sist in this evaluation and reporting process provides the taxpayer
with an assessment of the impact each transaction has on tax liabil-
ity.56 If the tax treatment of a particular transaction is uncertain or
subject to dispute, the lawyer offers advice designed to resolve
doubt in favor of the taxpayer and thereby minimize tax liability.
7
Guided by the duty of loyalty to the client, the tax lawyer as advo-
cate maximizes the taxpayer's chances of success in a future dis-
pute over questionable'return positions" by recommending mini-
(acknowledging the importance of partisan advocacy in criminal proceedings but
challenging its use in civil litigation).
55. Many of the observations made in this Article with respect to the use of ad-
versarial representation apply with equal force to the representation of taxpayers
during the administrative appeals process conducted by the IRS. However, a study
of that element of the compliance system is beyond the scope of this Article.
56. See Steven E. Kaplan et al., An Examination of Tax Reporting Recommenda-
tions of Professional Tax Preparers, 9 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 427,429 (1988) (stating that
tax practitioners approach their duty to clients by considering the law, the institu-
tional characteristics of the tax system, including what triggers an audit, and interac-
tion with IRS perspnnel).
57. See Special Comm. on the Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice, The Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of New York, The Lawyer's Role in Tax Practice, 36 TAX LAW. 865,
877 (1983) [hereinafter New York City Bar Report] (explaining that a tax lawyer
must act as loyal taxpayer advocate and resolve doubts in favor of the client); see
also MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-3 (stating that when an attorney is serving as
an advocate, the attorney should resolve doubt in favor of the client insofar as per-
mitted by law).
58. For purposes of this discussion it is essential to distinguish between
"questionable positions" and those the taxpayer is prohibited by law from asserting.
IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz once defined "questionable position" in the con-
text of return disclosure as "a position that is knowingly inconsistent with published
regulations, rulings or cases." Jerome Kurtz, Remarks to the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, 103 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) J-3 (1977), reprinted in
BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE 37 (2d ed. 1981). This definition is, however, incomplete in the sense that
it does not include all "debatable" return positions-all positions the taxpayer has a
right to litigate. Thus, a "questionable position" is any nonfrivolous return position.
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mal disclosure of information relating to those positions on the
taxpayer's return.59
Use of partisan advocacy by tax lawyers in connection with
the representation of taxpayers is consistent with the role of advo-
cate contemplated by the legal profession's rules of ethics. 6 How-
ever, the return preparation process includes features that set it
apart from traditional adversary proceedings. Moreover, the use
of partisan advocacy during preparation of the return produces
unusual results not contemplated by adversary theory. 1 To fully
understand the impact of partisan advocacy on the tax compliance
system, it is first necessary to consider the nature of the tax return
preparation and examination process.
The IRS is charged with responsibility for collection of the
proper amount of tax from each taxpayer at the least cost to the
public.62 Because taxpayer compliance is essential to the success of
this country's self-assessment system,6 much of the IRS's work in-
Cf MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 7-102(A)(2) (a lawyer may not "[k]nowingly ad-
vance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that he may
advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law"); MODEL RULES, supra note 31,
Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding... unless there is a basis
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an exten-
sion, modification or reversal of existing law.").
59. See generally supra Part III.A. (explaining the proper role of an attorney in
preparation of the tax return); infra Part III.B. (explaining the proper role of an at-
torney in subsequent examinations of tax returns).
60. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 166-207 and accompanying text.
62. See I.R.S. Policy Statement P-i-1 (Dec. 18, 1993), 1 INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL: ADMINISTRATION (CCH) 1303-25 ("The purpose of the Internal Revenue
Service is to collect the proper amount of tax revenue at the least cost; serve the
public by continually improving the quality of our products and services; and per-
form in a manner warranting the highest degree of public confidence in our integrity,
efficiency and fairness."); see also A.B.A. Comm'n on Taxpayer Compliance, Report
and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAx LAw. 329, 339 (1988)
[hereinafter Taxpayer Compliance Report] ("The objective [of the IRS] is not simply
to collect as much as possible in taxes, but rather to collect the correct amount in
taxes."); Lawrence B. Gibbs, Tax Reform: An Opportunity for a Fresh Start in Tax
Administration, 6 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y 1, 4 (1987) (summarizing the tensions between
the taxpayer and tax administrator caused by the new IRS mission to "collect the
proper amount of tax revenues at the least cost to the public").
63. See Ryan J. Donmoyer, Deputy Commissioner Defends Income Tax Against
Alternatives, 68 TAX NOTES 1538 (1995) (noting a 83% voluntary compliance rate
according to IRS Deputy Commissioner Michael P. Dolan); accord United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815-16 (1984) (describing the system as one re-
quiring voluntary compliance); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973)
(describing the system as one requiring voluntary compliance).
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volves compliance testing.64 In recent years the ability of the IRS
to evaluate compliance by taxpayers has been enhanced by the
third-party reporting requirements-a comparison of information
included on a taxpayer's return with information provided in re-
ports filed with the IRS by third parties.65 However, much of the
information included on income tax. returns remains outside the
reach of the third party reporting requirements and therefore can
be verified only through the examination of returns. 66 Thus, the
ability of the IRS to select and examine income tax returns is an
essential part of the compliance testing process.67
Because the IRS cannot audit every return filed in a given
64. See 1 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL: AUDIT (CCH) 4015.1 (June 29, 1984),
at 7006 [Hereinafter IRM: AUDIT] ("The mission of the service is to encourage and
achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary compliance with the tax laws and
regulations and to conduct itself so as to warrant the highest degree of public confi-
dence in its integrity and efficiency.").
65. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 7285, INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: GROSS TAX GAP ESTIMATES & PROJECTIONS FOR 1973-
1992, 5 (1988) [hereinafter 1973-1992 RESEARCH] ("In tax administration, it is axio-
matic that when third parties report to the tax agency the income they pay to indi-
viduals, compliance in reporting such income markedly improves."); Jeffrey Dubin et
al., The Effect of Audit Rates on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 1977-1986, 43
NAT'L TAX J. 395 (1992) (concluding that the drop in audit rates is in part due to in-
creased reliance by the IRS on third-party reporting). See generally John Andr6
LeDuc, Improving the Self-Assessment of Federal Income Tax: Recent Legislative
Developments, 19 TAX NOTES 1027 (1983) [hereinafter LeDuc, Improving]
(discussing the contribution of third-party reporting to the objective of full taxpayer
compliance).
66. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 62, at 334 (stating that not all
information can be verified through computer matching); see also I.R.C. § 7601(a)
(1994) (making a general obligation to examine returns); id § 7602(a)(1)
(authorizing the examination of taxpayer records in connection with the examination
of returns); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1436 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that
examining agents may investigate taxpayer treatment of issues). For a discussion of
the IRS's ability to gather information during an internal revenue audit, see infra
note 191 and accompanying text.
67. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 62, at 331 ("Tax audits and ex-
aminations are the key to effective enforcement."); HELEN V. TAUCHEN ET AL., TAX
COMPLIANCE: AN INVESTIGATION USING INDIVIDUAL TCMP DATA (National Bu-
reau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3078 23-24, 1989) (explaining that
the IRS believes that examination of returns promotes compliance both directly-
revenue increases attributable to additional taxes and penalties-and indirectly-
those examined become more compliant and others concerned about being caught
react in a similar fashion); see also Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., Penny-Wise and Pound
Foolish: New Estimates of the Impact of Audits on Revenue, 35 TAx NOTES 787
(1987) [hereinafter Dubin et al., Penny-Wise] (discussing the impact of taxpayer
compliance measures on the total revenue collected); Joint Comm. on Taxation,
Routes to Better Tax Compliance, 19 TAX NOTES 1187 (1983) (discussing a broad
range of solutions for improving taxpayer compliance).
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year," the agency relies primarily on the threat of audit to deter
noncompliance. 69 The IRS selects a small number of returns for
examination each year in order to monitor taxpayer compliance
and maintain in each taxpayer's mind a healthy concern over the
possibility of audit.7' The process used by the IRS to select returns
for audit is complex and closely guarded,7 1 but it is clear that the
selection process is based almost entirely on a review of the infor-
mation included on the return.72 Returns that include all relevant
68. See Dubin et al., Penny-Wise, supra note 67, at 791 (noting the "2-3 percent
audit rates of the early 1970s"); see also id at 790 (noting that that audit rate for in-
dividuals declined from 2 1/2% to just over 1% and corporate audit rates declined
from 9 1/2% to 3% during the period from 1977 to 1986). In the early years of the
income tax, the Bureau of Internal Revenue followed a policy of reviewing nearly
every return filed. See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 14 (1979) (citing 1919 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
REP. 18). That practice was abandoned by the Bureau in recognition of the growing
number of returns filed each year and the concern expressed by lawmakers and oth-
ers over the backlog of unaudited returns. See id. at 15-17.
69. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 62, at 350 ("Enforcement ef-
forts... are profitable, and, apart from their effects on specific taxpayers, can send
deterrence messages to the general public.").
70. See James Aim et al., Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance
with Experimental Data, 45 NAT'LTAX J. 107, 112 (1992) [hereinafter Aim et al., Es-
timating] (making the connection that compliance increases with increases in income
and audit rates and decreases with decreases in tax rates); James Alm et al., Deter-
rence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 311,
311-13 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) [hereinafter Alm et al., Deterrence] (commenting
that some taxpayers place more weight on the chance of being audited than it de-
serves, thereby increasing compliance); Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The
Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S.
Individual Income Tax, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 7 (1985) (suggesting a higher probability
of audit and increased number of notices sent to taxpayers following IRS review of
returns produce higher level of compliance).
71. See Bruce D. Haims, A Practitioner's Guide to the Preparation for and Con-
duct of a Tax Audit, in 2 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-
THIRD INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION § 24.03, at 24-10 (1995) (describing the
IRS audit selection process); John L. Wedick, Jr., Looking for a Needle in a Hay-
stack: How the IRS Selects Returns for Audit, 14 TAx ADVISOR 673 (1983); accord
MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE & PROCEDURE $ 8.03 (2d ed. 1991); 0.
Homer Erekson & Dennis H. Sullivan, A Cross-Section Analysis of IRS Auditing, 41
NAT'L TAx J. 175 (1988); IRM: AUDIT, supra note 64, 4034.4 (July 6, 1994) at 7025-5
(stating that examiners are required to review related returns for similar items, check
for consistent treatment and, when appropriate, examine those returns for evidence
of manual review of returns).
72. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 66, at 364 (stating that currently
when the IRS computer identifies a return as possibly problematic, it "is then re-
viewed by a tax examiner or revenue agent in a service center. This agent or exam-
iner decides if the return should be audited and, in many cases, also selects the items
or issues that will be the initial focus of the audit."); Boris I. Bittker, Professional Re-
sponsibility and the Preparation of Federal Income Tax Returns, in PROFESSIONAL
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information about a reported transaction provide the IRS with the
opportunity to evaluate the nature of the transaction, identify the
issues raised by the taxpayer's treatment of the transaction, and
consider the need for governmental review of the taxpayer's reso-
lution of the issue. On the other hand, returns which include
minimal information limit the ability of the government to engage
in this essential review process. 3 Thus, the taxpayer's ability to
control the nature and amount of information disclosed on a tax
return directly affects the process utilized by the IRS in selecting
returns for examination.
Tax return disclosure is, in large part, a function of the return
itself.74 Every taxpayer has a legal obligation to file a correct re-
turn,75 and a return that does not contain the information re-
quested by the IRS-either by way of a specific request on the re-
RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAx PRACrICE 245 (B. Bittker ed., 1970) [hereinafter
Bittker, Professional Responsibility]; Jeffrey A. Dubin et al., Are We a Nation of Tax
Cheaters? New Econometric Evidence on Tax Compliance, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 240,
241 (1987) [hereinafter Dubin et al., Tax Cheaters] (stating that the probability of
audit is a function of the items reported on the return).
It is of course clear that our federal self-assessment system presupposes that
the government will rely to a considerable degree on the income tax return
as filed in deciding which returns to select for office or field audit, as well as
in deciding what items should be subjected to further scrutiny in respect of
those returns that are selected for audit.
Bittker, Professional Responsibility, supra, at 245.
73. Cf Karyl A. Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement:
An Analysis of Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXEs: TAX COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT 259, 280-81 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (suggesting that in the absence
of supplemental disclosure, the government will continue to have more trouble with
unreported income than with inflated deductions).
74. Regarding the sufficiency of the return, see Commissioner v. Lane Wells Co.,
321 U.S. 219, 223 (1944) (discussing the importance of tax returns in gathering in-
formation, furthering uniformity, and making the administration of the system more
efficient).
75. See, e.g., Wiseley v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 253, 256 (1949) (holding that a
taxpayer is not permitted to plead ignorance to the duty to file a correct return);
Valverde v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, 629 (1987) (acknowledging the
taxpayer's obligation to file a correct return). The obligation to file a correct return
follows from the representation made by the taxpayer in the jurat on the return as
well as the minimum reporting standards imposed on taxpayers by relevant penalty
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 6065 (requiring written decla-
ration under penalty of perjury); id. § 6662 (regarding accuracy related penalty pro-
vision); id. § 6663 (regarding fraud penalty provision); Treas. Reg. § 31.6065(a)-i
(1960) (regarding verification of returns); see also Leroy Jewelry Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C. 443, 445 (1961) (holding on the duty to file correct return discussed in
the context of I.R.C. § 6653 negligence penalty); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(3) (as
amended in 1993) ("Each year's return should be complete in itself, and taxpayers
shall ascertain the facts necessary to make a correct return.").
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turn76 or pursuant to other disclosure guidelines7-does not satisfy
this requirement. The taxpayer's reporting obligations end with
the filing of a correct return; taxpayers have no obligation to vol-
unteer information to the IRS.78  It is therefore incumbent upon
the government to request from the taxpayer the information
needed to assess the treatment of transactions reported on a re-
turn.
Notwithstanding this need for information, the IRS imposes
few affirmative disclosure requirements on taxpayers. The variety
of transactions that form the basis for questionable return posi-
tions, the administrative problems inherent in collecting and
evaluating information received,79 and society's interest in mini-
76. Specific requests for information may take the form of (1) line item re-
quests-for example, each taxpayer must fill in all relevant portions of an income tax
return, (2) questions posed with respect to particular types of income or deduc-
tions-for example, the questions on Schedule B relating to foreign trust accounts
and on Schedule E relating to personal use of rental property, and (3) requests for
information imposed through the use of forms designed to address specific types of
transactions. See generally Deborah Lohse, Tax Report: A Special Summary and
Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1995, at Al
(explaining that taxpayers must "flag" wash sales on Schedule D).
77. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.351-3(a) (1996) (requiring shareholders to file a
statement that includes all information relevant to a § 351 transfer with the tax re-
turn); id. § 1.302-4(a)(1) (requiring disclosure of information related to waiver of
I.R.C. § 302(b)(3), which deals with family attribution rules); id. § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(2)
(regarding disclosure of "[a]ll of the details in connection with an involuntary con-
version of property at a gain").
78. Bittker, Professional Responsibility, supra note 72, at 252-53 ("Indeed, the
fact that the Regulations explicitly require disclosure of certain items might be taken
to imply that the taxpayer need disclose only those items that are so specified by the
Service .... ).
79. See id. at 253 (arguing that the volume of information produced by taxpayers
in response to the imposition of a supplemental disclosure requirement would pre-
vent the IRS from taking full advantage of the additional information); James P.
Holden, Practitioners' Standard of Practice and the Taxpayer's Reporting Position, 20
CAP. U. L. REv. 327, 343 (1991) [hereinafter Holden, Practitioner's Standard]
("Disclosure incentives will result in an increased volume of disclosure, necessitating
reasonable audit review of disclosures if they are to be meaningful."). However, this
ignores the effect that preparation and filing of the rider has on the taxpayer and the
tax lawyer. As in the case of contracts for which the Statute of Frauds requires a
writing, the effect of disclosure in writing forces the taxpayer to reassess the position
taken and consider its merits, given the potential for careful review by a third party.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs § 6.1, at 394 (2d ed. 1990) ("The suretyship
provision performs an important cautionary function, by bringing home to the
promisor the significance of the promise and preventing ill-considered and impulsive
promises."); see also George Guttman, Change the IRS Forms? It's Just Not That
Simple, 68 TAX NOTES 648 (1995) (discussing how recent efforts to reform the return
preparation and filing process suggest that the system is pursuing simplification at
the expense of disclosure).
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mizing governmental intrusion on the privacy rights of taxpayers80
undoubtedly are among those factors that prompt the IRS to re-
quest information from taxpayers only when absolutely neces-
sary.8 Failure to collect supplementary information has a societal
cost, however. The government's ability to identify issues raised
by a taxpayer's treatment of transactions on a return largely de-
pends upon taxpayer compliance with mandatory disclosure re-
quirements and taxpayer choices relating to supplemental disclo-
sure of information. When a taxpayer chooses to minimize
disclosure of information relating to transactions reported on a re-
turn, it often prevents the IRS from identifying and considering
questionable return positions.3
Thus, the effectiveness of the tax compliance testing system, in
many respects, depends upon the taxpayers it seeks to test. If tax-
payers cooperate by sharing relevant information with the IRS, the
agency can better select for examination those returns most in
need of review. Conversely, if taxpayers refuse to cooperate with
the IRS by minimizing disclosure of the information needed by the
government to assess the need for review of returns, tax compli-
ance suffers. 4 Of the two, the latter is a more accurate description
80. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Tax Returns-Confidentiality
vs. Public Disclosure, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 479 (1981) [hereinafter Bittker, Federal In-
come Tax] (examining the relationship between an individual's interest in privacy
and the public's right to know).
81. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 66, at 331 (commenting that
benefits attributable to strategies for enhancing taxpayer compliance must outweigh
increased invasion of privacy and additional burdens imposed on taxpayers).
82 See infra note 151 (quoting Professor Bittker on the purpose of tax returns
and whether taxpayers should disclose information voluntarily). One example of
voluntary taxpayer disclosure appears in Deupree v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 113
(1942), where the taxpayer, who had received compensation income in the form of
an annuity the taxpayer believed was not currently taxable, included the following
statement in his return: "'The Proctor & Gamble Company paid (during 1938)
$50,000.00 to the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company for an annuity
starting at age seventy. This. amount is not included in the salary here reported."'
Id. at 117.
83. See New York City Bar Report, supra note 57, at 882 ("As a consequence of
the aggressive positions taken by many taxpayers and the limited number of returns
that can be effectively audited, the Government loses revenue it should receive, re-
sulting in an inequitable sharing of the tax burden among taxpayers, and, most im-
portant, a growing disrespect for the fairness of the tax system.").
84. See Kurtz, supra note 58, at 37 ("The reason that we have to struggle with the
problem of how a questionable issue may be presented on the tax return is that our
voluntary compliance system gives to the taxpayer who has entered into a transac-
tion with uncertain tax consequences significant opportunity to decide how to report
the transaction on his or her return." (emphasis omitted)).
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of the situation confronting the IRS. Under the present system,
taxpayers frequently take aggressive positions on returns in the in-
terest of minimizing tax liability. These taxpayers limit disclosure
of information relating to aggressive return positions in an effort to
handicap IRS efforts to identify and debate the issues raised by
these return positions during examination of the return. 5 By
playing the "audit lottery"-taking a favorable return position that
the IRS would likely challenge, knowing that the risk of detection
is minimal if the position appears on the return without disclo-
sure -- taxpayers enjoy the benefits associated with questionable
return positions while prevailing over the IRS on those positions
by defaultY
A taxpayer interested in exploiting the opportunity to take
aggressive positions without disclosure naturally expects advice
from counsel consistent with that objective. Predictably, the law-
yer retained to represent a taxpayer during the return preparation
85. See generally Bittker, Federal Income Tax, supra note 80, at 485-90 (noting
that taxpayers withhold information from the government as a means of protecting
their privacy); Arthur R. Miller, Tax Compliance Versus Individual Privacy: A
Conflict Between Social Objectives, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: A REPORT OF THE
ABA SECTION OF TAXATION INVITATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE 173, 175 (1983) [hereinafter Miller, Tax Compliance]. Other reasons
have been offered for the reluctance of taxpayers to cooperate with governmental
efforts to enforce the revenue laws. See Aim et al., Deterrence, supra note 70, at 313-
14 (suggesting that a better use of tax revenues may change the way people look at
paying taxes, and thereby change attitudes about disclosure); John S. Carroll, How
Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in WHY PEOPLE PAY
TAXES, supra note 70, at 43, 46 (noting that the desire to avoid an InternalRevenue
audit encourages taxpayers to minimize disclosure); Robert J. Haws, A Brief History
of American Resistance to Taxation, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, supra, at 113
(noting the historic negative attitude of citizens toward taxation).
86. When a position appears on a return without disclosure, it appears in the
form of a conclusion offered without support. In the absence of information flagging
the controversial nature of the position and explaining the rationale behind the tax-
payer's conclusion, the government is left with a reported, but undisclosed, return
position.
87. See Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U.
FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (1987) ("[W]hen a person takes a questionable position on a
tax return, 'he or she may be effectively "resolving" the disputed issue' in the tax-
payer's favor.") (citing Kurtz, supra note 84, at 37); Jerome Kurtz et al., Discussion
on "Questionable Positions," 32 TAX LAw. 13, 15 (1978) (quoting IRS Commissioner
Jerome Kurtz as saying: "taxpayers can feel with some justification today that where
they take a questionable position on their returns ... there is a good chance that
they will prevail because the return will not be examined .... "); cf. LUBAN, supra
note 6, at 75 (discussing the concept of individual dignity in the context of the adver-
sary model and noting the distinction between a person pursuing what the person is
entitled to and pursuing everything the person can get).
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process responds to client expectations and the ethical duty of
loyalty by assuming the role of advocate. As taxpayer advocate,
the lawyer resolves doubts on questionable positions in favor of
the client and maximizes the chances of prevailing on those posi-
tions by advising the taxpayer to minimize disclosure of informa-
tion not specifically requested by the return or the internal reve-
nue laws. The profession's rules of ethics, which fail to restrict
the use of partisanship to services rendered in traditional adversar-
ial settings, encourage this use of partisan advocacy by the tax law-
yer.9 Nevertheless, a number of factors-the nature of the return
preparation process, the significance of the government's role as
enforcement officer, and the importance of taxpayer compliance-
strongly suggest that the use of partisan advocacy is not justified in
this setting.
Because the legal profession's Canons of Ethics91 failed to ad-
dress the roles and corresponding duties of the tax lawyer,92 tax
experts engaged in a debate during the early years of tax practice
about the role of the tax advisor and the nature of the return
88. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-3 ("While serving as advocate, a law-
yer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law.").
89. See supra note 87. The question of disclosure is an issue even in the most ex-
treme cases. For example, a taxpayer decision to omit cash receipts from gross in-
come might involve disclosure even though the amount received is not reported,
given the government's need to consider the taxpayer's decision to exclude the
amount from income. Similarly, the decision to report an expenditure as a deduction
does not eliminate the importance of supplemental disclosure if the government is to
consider the rationale behind the deduction.
90. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
91. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). The legal profession recog-
nized the Canons of Ethics, promulgated by the American Bar Association in 1908,
as the governing body of ethical standards until 1969 when the ABA approved the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. MODEL CODE, supra note 5. The pro-
fession subsequently amended the Code in 1983 with the issuance of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES, supra note 31. See generally WOLFRAM,
supra note 5, at 48-63 (discussing the history, rationale, function, and application of
lawyer codes of ethics).
92. See John M. Maguire, Conscience and Propriety in Lawyer's Tax Practice, 13
TAX L. REv. 27, 30-31 (1957) (acknowledging the lack of guidance provided by the
Canons of Ethics and calling for the development of a specialized body of rules
dealing with the ethics of tax practice); Francis C. Oatway, Motivation and Respon-
sibility in Tax Practice: The Need for Definition, 20 TAx L. REv. 237, 244 (1965)
(making a similar proposal); see also Marvin K. Collie & Thomas P. Marinis, Jr.,
Ethical Considerations on Discovery of Error in Tax Returns, 22 TAX LAw. 455, 460
(1969) ("The legal profession has never felt the need to designate a separate body of
rules to govern the lawyer's conduct in the area of tax practice.").
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preparation process." The IRS's role as both tribunal and oppo-
nent, together with the obvious threat to tax compliance posed by
a taxpayer's ability to limit disclosure on a return, prompted a
number of commentators to endorse a standard for professional
conduct that would impose on lawyers duties to the government as
well as the client. 4 Other commentators were less troubled by the
unusual nature of the return preparation process and supported an
adversarial approach to the return preparation process out of loy-
alty to the traditional attorney-client relationship and concern over
the government's lack of impartiality.95 Debate over the nature of
the process and the lawyer's duties as taxpayer advisor prompted a
study by the ABA Section of Taxation in 196296 and led ultimately
to official guidance from the American Bar Association (ABA)
93. See, e.g., Bittker, Professional Responsibility, supra note 72, at 233; Edmond
Cahn, Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners, 8 TAX L. REv. 1 (1952); Norris Darrell,
Responsibilities of the Lawyer in Tax Practice, in WILLIAM M. TRUMBULL, MA-
TERIALS ON THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 291 (1957); Norris Dar-
rell, The Tax Practitioner's Duty to His Client and His Government, 7 PRAC. LAW. 23
(1961); Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to His
Client and to the Govemment?-the Theory, 15 TAX INST. 25 (1963); Maguire, supra
note 92; Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY DECENNIAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1067 (1952); Randolph
E. Paul, The Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor, 63 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1950)
[hereinafter Paul, Responsibilities].
94. See Maguire, supra note 92, at 36 ("In matters of taxation the lawyer is often
doubly charged, owing fidelity both to client and to Treasury."); Oatway, supra note
92, at 254 ("Most will agree that some form of dual responsibility to both client and
government does exist."); Thomas N. Tarleau, Ethical Problems in Dealing with
Treasury Representatives, 8 TAx L. REv. 10, 11 (1952) ("[B]ecause of the tax practi-
tioner's dual responsibility, he is obliged to reveal every fundamental fact which is
pertinent to the issue under consideration.").
95. See Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility in Representing Taxpayers, in
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 72, at 270 [hereinafter Bittker, Represent-
ing Taxpayers]; Johnson, supra note 93, at 31 (noting that taxpayers will have confi-
dence in the system only if convinced that they will receive adequate representa-
tion-a goal achieved most effectively by insisting that lawyers serve taxpayers as
traditional advocates); Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Advisor, 25 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 412,429 (1953) [hereinafter Paul, Lawyer].
[E]xcept where the rules of practice dictate otherwise tax proceedings in the
Treasury are predominantly adversary proceedings calling for no higher
ethical standards than those imposed upon attorneys engaged in general
practice.... Treasury representatives are subject to many pressures, and as
a rule their conduct closely resembles the conduct of attorneys in private
litigation.
Id; Bittker, Representing Taxpayers, supra, at 270.
96. See Report of Special Committee on Standards of Tax Practice, A.B.A. SEC.
TAX'N BULL. 269, July 1964, at 269. For a discussion of this report and its influence
on Formal Opinion 314, see James R. Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client
That He May Take a Position on His Tax Return?, 29 TAX LAW. 237,244-45 (1975).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Ethics Committee 7 in the form of Formal Opinion 314.98
In Formal Opinion 314, the ABA Ethics Committee began its
consideration of the ethical responsibilities of the tax lawyer with
the following statement:
Certainly a lawyer's advocacy before the Internal Reve-
nue Service must be governed by "the same principles of
ethics which justify his appearance before the Courts."
But since the service, however fair and impartial it may
try to be, is the representative of one of the parties, does
the lawyer owe it the same duty of disclosure which is
owed to the courts? Or is his duty to it more nearly
analogous to that which he owes his brother attorneys in
the conduct of cases which should be conducted in an at-
mosphere of candor and fairness but are admittedly ad-
versary in nature?"
The Committee concluded that the IRS lacks the impartiality
necessary for treatment as a true tribunal00 and, therefore, must be
characterized as an opponent when defining the ethical duties of
the tax lawyer."' Characterization of the government as an adver-
sary inevitably led the Committee to invoke the adversary sys-
97. For the sake of simplicity, this Article will refer to the ABA Standing Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and its predecessor, the Committee
on Professional Ethics, as the ABA Ethics Committee. See Durst, supra note 87, at
1031 n.11.
98. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314
(1965), reprinted in 51 A.B.A. J. 671 (1965) [hereinafter Formal Op. 314].
99. Id. at 671 (citing Canon 26, which provides that "[a] lawyer openly, and in his
true character, may render professional services... in advocacy of claims before de-
partments of government, upon the same principles of ethics which justify his ap-
pearance before the Courts").
100. The Committee made the following observations about the IRS:
The Internal Revenue Service is neither a true tribunal, nor even a quasi-
judicial institution. It has no machinery or procedure for adversary pro-
ceedings before impartial judges or arbiters, involving the weighing of
conflicting testimony of witnesses examined and cross-examined by oppos-
ing counsel and the consideration of arguments of counsel for both sides of
a dispute. While its procedures provide for "fresh looks" through depart-
mental reviews and informal and formal conference procedures, few will
contend that the service provides any truly dispassionate and unbiased
consideration to the taxpayer. Although willing to listen to taxpayers and
their representatives and obviously intending to be fair, the service is not
designed and does not purport to be unprejudiced and unbiased in the ju-
dicial sense.
Id.
101. See Durst, supra note 87, at 1032 ("The committee determined that the
Service is an adversary, not a 'true tribunal' .... ").
[Vol. 30:693
TAXPAYER REPRESENTATION
tem'02 and use the profession's Canons of Ethics-rules dedicated
to the conduct of lawyers as advocates' 03-to define the ethical re-
sponsibilities of the tax lawyer. The opinion admonished lawyers
to respect the ethical duties of candor and fairness,' 4 loyalty to the
law,' and commitment to the profession and justice0 , but other-
wise imposed no obligation on the lawyer that would compromise
the duty of loyalty to the client.. Accordingly, the opinion stated
that the tax lawyer must avoid statements and omissions that mis-
lead the IRS... but is under no obligation to disclose weaknesses in
the client's case0 8 and is free to recommend a return position most
favorable to the client if there is a reasonable basis for that posi-
tion.?9 Consistent with its endorsement of the adversarial ap-
102. See id. at 1034 ("The opinion recognized no considerations distinguishing the
preparation of a return from any other adversarial act."); Falk, supra note 52, at 646
("Opinion 314 began with the premise that the Service and the tax lawyer are adver-
saries."); cf Bittker, Representing Taxpayer, supra note 95, at 274 ("Unless tax prac-
tice is unique, and I do not think it is, the standards and practices that have devel-
oped in the conduct of adversary proceedings elsewhere are bound to influence, and
more likely to dominate, the conduct of proceedings before the Service.").
103. See supra note 44.
104. See Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 671 ("It is unprofessional and dishon-
orable to deal other than candidly with the facts ... in the presentation of causes.
These and all kindred practices are unprofessional and unworthy of an officer of the
law charged, as is the lawyer, with the duty of aiding in the administration of justice."
(quoting MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 22)).
105. See id. at 671-72 ("No client.., is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer
render . . . any advice involving disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are."
(quoting MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 32)).
106. See id. at 671 (A lawyer "should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to
maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the ad-
ministration of justice." (quoting MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 29)).
107. See id. at 672 ("In all cases, with regard both to the preparation of returns
and negotiating administrative settlements, the lawyer is under a duty not to mislead
the Internal Revenue Service deliberately and affirmatively, either by misstatements
or by silence or by permitting his client to mislead.").
108. See id. ("[A]s an advocate before a service which itself represents the adver-
sary point of view, where his client's case is fairly arguable, a lawyer is under no duty
to disclose its weaknesses, any more than he would be to make such a disclosure to a
brother lawyer."); see also Fredric G. Corneel, Guidelines for Tax Practice Second, 43
TAX LAw. 297, 311 (1990) (stating that the lawyer's obligation to tell the truth does
not require disclosure of relevant facts and law to the IRS); cf Stamm Int'l Corp. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315 (1988) (holding that a settlement that cost the IRS ap-
proximately $700,000 would not be set aside due to the ignorance of government
counsel).
109. See Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672 ("[A] lawyer who is asked to ad-
vise his client in the course of the preparation of the client's tax returns may freely
urge the statement of positions most favorable to the client just as long as there is
reasonable basis for those positions."). The "reasonable basis" standard established
by Formal Opinion 314 has been the subject of considerable debate among commen-
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proach to the return preparation process, the Committee made the
following statement regarding disclosure on returns:
[W]here the lawyer believes there is a reasonable basis for
a position that a particular transaction does not result in
taxable income, or that certain expenditures are properly
deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty to advise
that riders be attached to the client's tax return explaining
the circumstances surrounding the transaction or the ex-
penditures. 0
The reasonable basis standard represented an effort on the
part of the legal profession to modify the traditional duty of the
advocate in situations involving the most aggressive of return po-
sitions."' Presumably, the Committee believed that positions
which failed to satisfy the reasonable basis standard represented
such a threat to the taxing system that counseling avoidance or
disclosure of these positions-advice representing a clear depar-
ture from traditional partisan advocacy-could be justified. How-
ever, the reasonable basis standard did not alter the partisan be-
havior of tax lawyers; in practice, the lawyers used the standard to
justify recommending nondisclosure of nearly any nonfrivolous
position.112 The profession's failure to define and enforce the rea-
tators. See, e.g., Durst, supra note 87, at 1038-48; Gwen Thayer Handelman, Con-
straining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAX REv. 77 (1989) [hereinafter Handel-
man, Constraining]; J. Timothy Philipps et al., It's Not Easy Being Easy: Advising
Tax Return Positions, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 589, 611 (1993) [hereinafter Philipps
et al., It's Not Easy]; Rowen, supra note 96, at 242-44.
110. Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672.
111. In commenting on the reasonable basis standard in 1985, the ABA Ethics
Committee confirmed that its intention in Formal Opinion 314 was to establish a
higher reporting standard:
The Committee is informed that the standard of "reasonable basis" has
been construed by many lawyers to support the use of any colorable claim
on a tax return to justify exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit
selection process. This view is not universally held, and the Committee
does not believe that the reasonable basis standard, properly interpreted
and applied, permits this construction.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985),
reprinted in 39 TAX LAw. 631, 631 (1986) [hereinafter Formal Op. 85-352]; see also
Kenneth L. Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions on a Client's Federal Tax Re-
turn: An Analysis of the Revised Section 6694(a) Standard, 47 TAX NOTES 971, 972
(1990) [hereinafter Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions] (explaining that the
reasonable basis standard probably intended a high reporting standard); Philipps et
al., It's Not Easy, supra note 109, at 611 (also stating that the reasonable basis may
have been intended as a relatively high reporting standard).
112. The Task Force Report issued by the ABA Committee on Standards of Tax
Practice in connection with the release of Formal Opinion 85-352, the successor to
Formal Opinion 314, makes the following observation:
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sonable basis standard established by Formal Opinion 314,113 to-
gether with the lack of guidance offered tax practitioners by sub-
sequent revisions in the profession's rules of ethics, 4 prompted the
ABA Ethics Committee to revisit the question of tax return disclo-
sure in 1985 in Formal Opinion 85-352.1"
The Committee began its reconsideration of the lawyer's du-
ties as tax return advisor"6 by implicitly endorsing the conclusion
of Formal Opinion 314 that the return preparation process should
Doubtless there were some tax practitioners who intended "reasonable ba-
sis" to set a relatively high standard of tax reporting. Some have continued
to apply such a standard. To more, however, if not most tax practitioners,
the ethical standard set by "reasonable basis" had become a low one. To
many it had come to permit any colorable claim to be put forth; to permit
almost any words that could be strung together to be used to support a tax
return position.
Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAx LAW. 635, 638
(1986) [hereinafter Task Force Report]; see also Philipps et al., It's Not Easy, supra
note 109, at 611 (noting the steady diminution of the reasonable basis standard).
[T]he force of the term 'reasonable basis' has eroded over the ensuing 20
years of usage. It is not surprising that this erosion has occurred, given that
no one has been enforcing the standard-no one appears to have been cau-
tioning or disciplining practitioners who inadvertently or intentionally vio-
lated the reasonable basis standard.
James P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Marketplace: Opinions 314,
346 and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REv. 209, 235 (1985) [hereinafter Holden, New
Professional].
113. See ABA Section of Taxation Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 314 (May
21, 1984), reprinted in BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACrICE 71 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter Prop. Rev. to
Op. 314] ("The 'reasonable basis' standard of practice promulgated in Formal
Opinion 314 has been the subject of misinterpretation and misapplication, to the ex-
tent that it has been construed to support the use of any colorable claim to justify
exploitation of the lottery of the tax return audit selection process."); Handelman,
supra note 109, at 95 (concluding that concern over exploitation of the audit lottery
prompted action by the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
in the form of Formal Opinion 85-352).
114. See also Collie & Marinis, supra note 92, at 460 n.16 (noting that during work
by the ABA on the 1969 Model Code, "the Chairman of the ABA Tax Section's
Committee on Standards of [Tax] Practice, inquired of the Tax Section Committee
whether the revision of the Canons of Ethics should provide special rules for tax
lawyers. Such survey found the Committee overwhelmingly opposed to such an ap-
proach"). See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 5 (containing no special ethical
requirements for tax attorneys); MODEL RULES, supra note 31 (containing no special
ethical requirements for tax attorneys).
115. See Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 111, at 631; see also New York City Bar
Report, supra note 57, at 883 (discussing the points for and against reconsideration
of Formal Opinion 314).
116. The guidelines established by the Committee in Formal Opinion 314 con-
tinue to apply with respect to lawyers representing taxpayers in negotiations with the
IRS. See infra note 138.
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be treated as an adversarial proceeding17 and that the tax lawyer's
duties are those of an advocate." On the question of return dis-
closure, the Committee abandoned the reasonable basis standard
and focused instead on the lawyer's assessment of each reporting
position:
Thus, where a lawyer has a good faith belief in the valid-
ity of a position.., that a particular transaction does not
result in taxable income or that certain expenditures are
properly deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty to
require as a condition of his or her continued representa-
tion that riders be attached to the client's tax return ex-
plaining the circumstances surrounding the transaction or
the expenditures.'"
The Committee concluded that a lawyer can have a good faith
belief in the validity of a position only if there is "some realistic
possibility of success if the matter is litigated,"'20 but acknowledged
that "[a] lawyer can have a good faith belief in this context even if
the lawyer believes the client's position probably will not pre-
117. In fact, the opinion does not take a firm position on the adversarial nature of
the process. The Task Force Report on Formal Opinion 85-352 suggests that the
opinion does not characterize the return preparation process as an adversarial pro-
ceeding. See Task Force Report, supra note 112, at 640. This disclaimer notwith-
standing, the Committee's description of the tax return as a report that "may be the
first step in development of an adversarial relationship between the client and the
Internal Revenue Service" and its continued endorsement of an approach to repre-
sentation that permits nondisclosure on returns in all but the most egregious circum-
stances is strong evidence of the adversarial nature of the process. See Durst, supra
note 87, at 1046 ("On the whole, the opinion seems to reaffirm the view of the return
as an adversarial document."); Falk, supra note 52, at 647 ("Opinion 352 partially
reverts to the view that tax returns are adversarial."); Philipps et al., It's Not Easy,
supra note 109, at 612 n.139 (concluding that the Opinion 85-352 "lends credence to
the adversarial viewpoint"). For further evidence in support of the Committee's en-
dorsement of the process as adversarial, see infra note 121.
118. See Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 115, at 632 ("The ethical standards gov-
erning the conduct of a lawyer in advising a client on positions that can be taken in a
tax return are no different from those governing a lawyer's conduct in advising or
taking positions for a client in other civil matters."). Formal Opinion 85-352 ac-
knowledges that the tax lawyer serves as both advisor and advocate-a departure
from Formal Opinion 314 prompted by the profession's recognition in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct of the various roles of the lawyer-but nevertheless
sanctions adversarial conduct in reliance on the Model Rules. See id. (citing MODEL
RULES, supra note 31, Rules 1.2(d), 3.1).
119. Id. at 633.
120. Id.; see Falk, supra note 52, at 654 (criticizing the Committee's use of legal
realism).
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vail. ,121,
Standards of conduct for tax practitioners established by the
Treasury Department's Rules of Practice-commonly referred to
as Circular 230 1 ---and by the tax return preparer penalty provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code2 also offer insight into the na-
ture of the return preparation process and the role played by the
lawyer as tax return advisor. Following an unsuccessful effort
during the 1980s to characterize the return preparation process as
nonadversarial,124 the Treasury Department acquiesced to the ad-
versarial approach urged upon it by the legal profession by adopt-
ing a "realistic possibility" standard not unlike the standard devel-
oped by the ABA Ethics Committee in Formal Opinion 85-352221
Under Circular 230, a tax practitioner 12 preparing a return or ad-
vising on return positions may recommend any position believed
to have at least a one-in-three chance of being sustained on the
meritsn7 without discussing either the need for supplemental dis-
121. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 115, at 633 (citations omitted); see MODEL
CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-4 ("The advocate may urge any permissible construction
of the law favorable to his client, without regard to his professional opinion as to the
likelihood that the construction will ultimately prevail."); MODEL RULES, supra note
31, Rule 3.1, cmt. 2 ("[A]n action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes
that the client's position ultimately will not prevail."); see also Falk, supra note 52, at
657 (proclaiming that any position supported by "some reasoned support" should
satisfy the good faith belief standard established by Formal Opinion 85-352).
122. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-.101 (1996).
123. See generally I.R.C. § 6694 (1994) (creating a penalty relating to the under-
statement of taxpayer liability by return preparer).
124. Following release of Formal Opinion 85-352 in 1985, the Treasury Depart-
ment issued a proposal to amend its Rules of Practice that included an endorsement
of a nonadversarial approach to the preparation of tax returns. See infra note 156
and accompanying text. The proposal met with considerable resistance from profes-
sional groups and eventually was withdrawn in favor of the litigation-based standard
endorsed by the legal profession. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section,
Comments on Proposed Modification of Circular 230, 34 TAX NOTES 1113 (1987).
See generally Durst, supra note 87, at 1051 n.86 (discussing the Treasury's proposal
and method of imposing a penalty).
125. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (adopting the realistic possibility standard).
126. The Rules of Practice impose standards of conduct on attorneys, certified
public accountants, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and others qualifying to
practice before the IRS. See id. § 10.3.
127. See id. § 10.34(a)(4)(i) (defining "realistic possibility" as "a one in three...
likelihood of being sustained on [the] merits"). Although Formal Opinion 85-352
makes no attempt to quantify the realistic possibility of success standard, the report
issued concurrently with the opinion suggests that a position having at least a 33%
chance of success should meet the standard. See Task Force Report, supra note 112,
at 638-39.
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closure or possible exposure to penalties.ln In addition, these rules
,permit a practitioner not serving as a return preparer to recom-
mend any other nonfrivolous position provided the practitioner
explores with the taxpayer the applicability of the accuracy-related
penalty and the opportunity to avoid the penalty through disclo-
sure.9 Similarly, the return preparer penalty provision utilizes the
realistic possibility standard in connection with an evaluation of
the role played by a return preparer in assisting with the prepara-
tion of a return." Section 6694 imposes a $250 penalty on return
preparers who knowingly prepare a return containing an undis-
closed or frivolous position that does not have at least a one-in-
three chance of being sustained on the merits. 3' Thus, the stan-
dards imposed on lawyers by both the Rules of Practice and the In-
ternal Revenue Code's preparer penalty provision are wholly con-
sistent with the approach taken by the legal profession in defining
the nature of the return preparation process and the lawyer's du-
ties as advisor: The lawyer may serve as taxpayer advocate by re-
solving doubt on questionable positions in favor of the taxpayer,
by evaluating the propriety of return positions through an assess-
ment of the likelihood of success at trial, and by discussing with the
client the possible imposition of penalties with respect to the most
questionable of positions.
128. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (prohibiting a return preparer from signing a re-
turn containing a position that fails to satisfy this standard). The practitioner's duty
to discuss disclosure in the context of taxpayer penalties was first acknowledged by
the legal profession in Formal Opinion 85-352 in recognition of the § 6661 substan-
tial understatement penalty. See infra note 274. The reference in Circular 230 to the
accuracy-related penalty is made in recognition of the consolidation of many tax-
payer penalty provisions, including penalties for substantial understatement, negli-
gence, and disregard of rules and regulations, into the § 6662 accuracy-related pen-
alty provision. See generally I.R.C. § 6662(a), (d) (regarding a substantial
understatement of income tax). For a discussion of the substantial understatement
penalty, see infra notes 208-36 and accompanying text.
129. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1)(ii); see also supra note 128 (discussing the practi-
tioner's duty to discuss disclosure in the context of taxpayer penalties).
130. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1991)
(utilizing the realistic possibility standard). For purposes of the return preparer
penalty provisions, "income tax return preparer" is defined to include a paid pre-
parer who prepares all or a substantial portion of a return. See I.R.C. §
7701(a)(36)(A); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(2) (as amended in 1991)
(distinguishing between signing and nonsigning preparers).
131. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(a)(1)-(b)(1) (as amended in 1991) (defining real-
istic possibility in terms of a one-in-three chance of success).
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B. Examination of the Return
The internal revenue audit provides the government with an
opportunity to gather information needed to confirm that the tax-
payer has filed a correct return. During examination of a return,
the examining agent reviews taxpayer records primarily in an ef-
fort to substantiate items claimed as deductions and to identify re-
ceipts properly characterized as income but not reported as such
by the taxpayer.1 2 Thus, the internal revenue audit is inherently
invasive and often time-consuming. It is also threatening to return
positions which, if discovered during examination of the return,
might result in the assessment of additional tax, penalties, and in-
terest. For these and other reasons, taxpayers who acknowledge
the importance of the audit process to society may nevertheless as-
sume an adversarial position relative to the examining agent, rec-
ognizing that cooperation through voluntary disclosure increases
the likelihood that return positions will be discovered and chal-
lenged."'
The lawyer retained to represent a taxpayer during examina-
tion of a return responds to client expectations and to the profes-
sional duty of loyalty owed to the client by assuming the role of
advocate and taking all steps necessary to maximize the likelihood
that the client will prevail.3 During examination of the return, the
lawyer assists the taxpayer in complying with the agent's requests
for information but, in true adversarial form, warns against volun-
tary disclosure of information.3 During negotiations with the ex-
amining agent, the lawyer vigorously defends return positions re-
viewed by the agent through argument and reference to favorable
authorities but avoids calling to the agent's attention other issues
not considered during the audit. 3' Obviously, this partisan ap-
proach to the return examination process hinders the IRS in its ef-
fort to ensure that taxpayers comply with the Internal Revenue
laws. Nevertheless, the legal profession endorses the role of the
lawyer as taxpayer advocate during audit of a return.
132. See SALTZMAN, supra note 71, 8.03, 8.06(1)(a), 8.06(3)(a); Haims, supra
note 71, §§ 24.05[l], 24.09. See generally Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note
66, at 339-41 (discussing the various forms of noncompliance).
133. See Holden, New Professional, supra note 112, at 212-15 (finding that taxpay-
ers are in favor of compliance but resist the idea of their own participation in an in-
ternal revenue audit).
134. See Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672.
135. See Haims, supra note 71, § 24.09[3][c].
136. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
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In Formal Opinion 314, the ABA Ethics Committee re-
sponded to the lack of guidance provided by the legal profession's
Canons of Ethics with the following statement endorsing the law-
yer's role as advocate during negotiations with the IRS:
In the absence of either judicial determination or of a hy-
pothetical exchange of files by adversaries, counsel will
always urge in aid of settlement of a controversy the
strong points of his case and minimize the weak; this is in
keeping with Canon 15, which does require "warm zeal"
on behalf of the client. Nor does the absolute duty not to
make false assertions of fact require the disclosure of
weaknesses in the client's case and in no event does it re-
quire the disclosure of... confidences, unless the facts in
the attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime will be committed.'37
The role of the lawyer as taxpayer representative following prepa-
ration and filing of a return was not reconsidered by the Commit-
tee in Formal Opinion 85-352.' Therefore, this statement in For-
mal Opinion 314 continues to govern the ethical conduct of
lawyers engaged to represent taxpayers during the audit stage of
the compliance process.
As advocate, the lawyer represents the interests of the tax-
payer in negotiations with the examining agent in an effort to
maximize the chances of prevailing on issues raised during the
audit. However, the duty of loyalty to the client is subject to duties
that the lawyer owes to the government. Although the lawyer has
no obligation to volunteer information,'39 the lawyer must respect
the ethical duty of fairness owed to every opponent and the de-
rivative duty, acknowledged in Formal Opinion 314, to avoid mis-
leading the IRS deliberately, either by misstatement or silence.4 '
137. Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672; see Durst, supra note 87, at 1030-31;
Falk, supra note 52, at 643-51.
138. Formal Opinion 85-352 was limited to an evaluation of a lawyer's duties in
connection with advising on positions taken by taxpayers on returns. See Formal Op.
85-352, supra note 115, at 632 ("This position reconsiders and revises only that part
of Opinion 314 that relates to the lawyer's duty in advising a client of positions that
can be taken on a tax return."); see also Phillips, supra note 109, at 610 ("Opinion
314 still has effect with respect to dealing with the IRS after an audit has be-
gun .... ).
139. See Corneel, supra note 108, at 311 ("[W]e are under no legal or ethical obli-
gation to volunteer to the Service information adverse to the client or to urge the
client to do so.").
140. See supra note 107.
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The resulting obligation to answer questions honestly and provide
relevant information on request, while subject to the duty to main-
tain client confidences, 14' nevertheless promotes a level of taxpayer
cooperation needed during examination of the return. However,
cooperation received from the taxpayer and counsel is "passive" in
the sense that it is available only in response to requests for infor-
mation and, consistent with the adversarial nature of the process, is
offered only to the extent necessary to comply with the request.42
The Treasury Department's Rules of Practice do little to alter
either the adversarial nature of the process or the lawyer's role as
taxpayer advocate.1 43 In fact, the duties described in Circular 230
simply confirm that those general ethical duties observed by the
lawyer when representing clients should be respected when repre-
senting taxpayers before the IRS. Circular 230 defines the ethical
duty of fairness to the opponent as an obligation to submit non-
privileged records and information in response to a proper and
lawful request made by a representative of the IRS, a duty to ex-
ercise due diligence in preparing documents submitted to the IRS,
and a duty to ascertain the accuracy of representations made to the
IRS.14 In Circular 230 the ethical duty of competent representa-
141. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Canon 4, DR 4-101 (regarding the preserva-
tion of client confidences and secrets); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.6
(discussing confidentiality of information); see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.20(a) (1995)
(acknowledging the right to withhold privileged records and information).
142. See Harold R. Burnstein, Tips On Dealing Successfully with IRS Agents
During All Pretrial Stages, 6 J. TAX'N 266, 268 (1957) (advising practitioners to avoid
volunteering information); David F. Lane, It's a Jungle Out There: Survival Tech-
niques, 23 TAX ADVISER 613 (1992) (stating that it is sufficient to provide to the ex-
amining agent only the information specifically requested). In this sense, the atti-
tude of the taxpayer and tax lawyer is not unlike that of a party and advocate
involved in an adversary proceeding. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the
Rules of Practice).
144. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.20(a) (prohibiting a practitioner from neglecting or refus-
ing to submit records or information requested by the IRS unless the practitioner has
a good faith belief that the records or information are privileged or that the request
is of doubtful legality); id § 10.22 (imposing a duty to exercise due diligence in pre-
paring or assisting the preparation of documents submitted to the Service and in de-
termining the correctness of representations made to the Service); cf. MODEL CODE,
supra note 5, DR 7-102(A)(3), (5) (regarding making false statements and failing to
disclose that which the law requires to be disclosed); MODEL RULES, supra note 31,
Rule 4.1 (regarding truthfulness in statements to others). In 1986 the Department of
the Treasury proposed the following definition of "due diligence":
[A]s a standard of professional responsibility in the area of tax return
preparation, due diligence requires the practitioner to be assured that any
reporting position is in compliance with and supportable by the revenue
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tion requires counsel to advise clients when they have failed to
comply with the internal revenue laws.' 45 Conduct prohibited by
the legal profession's rules of ethics is also proscribed by the Rules
of Practice: A practitioner may be suspended or disbarred from
practice before the IRS following suspension or disbarment from
the practice of law in any state.' The Rules of Practice make no
effort to modify the adversarial approach to taxpayer representa-
tion by imposing duties on the lawyer and other tax practitioners
that are owed to the government in recognition of their role as
members of the tax bar and out of concern over the effects of par-
tisanship on the tax compliance process. Thus, the rules promul-
gated by the legal profession and the Treasury Department en-
dorse the lawyer's traditional role of advocate in the context of the
representation of taxpayers.
C. Questioning Adversarial Representation of Taxpayers
Is adversarial representation of taxpayers justified in the con-
text of the return preparation and examination process? The an-
laws. Unless the position is reasonable, meritorious and made in good
faith, a practitioner has not exercised the necessary diligence imposed upon
him or her. The due diligence standard cannot be met by a position ad-
vanced principally to exploit the audit selection process, a position that
serve [sic] as a mere "arguing" position advanced solely to obtain leverage
in the bargaining process of settlement negotiation within the IRS, a posi-
tion that would serve merely to avert a successful charge that the return is
false or fraudulent, or a position that has no practical and realistic possibil-ity of being sustained in the courts.
Department of the Treasury, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113,
29,113-14 (1986) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). This proposal was withdrawn in
response to criticism received from a number of professional organizations. See, e.g.,
AICPA Expresses Reservations Regarding Amendments to Circular 230, 34 TAX
NOTES 966 (1987); New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, supra note 124, at 1113-
16. Debate over the meaning of "due diligence" continues. See, e.g., Marianne
Evans, Preparer Penalty Guidance Expected by Early January, 49 TAX NOTES 1278
(1990) (discussing the various interpretations of "due diligence" standard of Circular
230); William L. Raby, Circular 230 Still Leaves Gaps Between the Profession and the
IRS, 57 TAx NOTES 511 (1992) (noting the effect and shortcomings of proposed
amendments).
145. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (duty to inform client of failure to comply with internal
revenue laws); cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 6-101(A)(1) (requiring compe-
tency); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.1 (regarding the duty of competence);
id. Rule 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client .... ).
146. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (granting the Treasury Secretary the authority to sus-
pend or disbar a practitioner for incompetence or disreputable conduct); id. §
10.51(g) (defining "disreputable conduct" to include "disbarment or suspension from
practice as an attorney").
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swer lies in an examination of both the tax compliance process and
adversary theory. Partisan advocacy has positive and negative
implications. Thus, whether its use is justified in contexts other
than traditional adversarial proceedings depends on a comparison
of the benefits derived from its use with its detrimental effects.
1. The nature of the tax compliance system
The legal profession insists that advocacy on behalf of taxpay-
ers is both appropriate and mandated by its rules of professional
conduct.14 7 In 1966 the ABA Ethics Committee concluded in For-
mal Opinion 314 that adversarial representation of taxpayers was
justified by the government's inability to serve as impartial tribu-
nal as well as opponent.' 4' In 1985 the Committee affirmed its po-
sition on the use of advocacy in this setting by observing in Formal
Opinion 85-352 that "the filing of the tax return may be the first
step in a process that may result in an adversary relationship be-
tween the client and the IRS."' 49 Is this an accurate portrayal of
the tax compliance system or merely an excuse offered in support
of the traditional approach to client representation?
The observations made by the ABA Ethics Committee about
the dual role of the IRS and the possibility of future disputes be-
tween taxpayers and their government are beyond dispute, and
both factors must be considered when analyzing the nature of the
dispute resolution process utilized by the IRS. However, the role
of the IRS and the potential for disagreement represented by an
aggressive return position should not serve as the basis for charac-
terizing a compliance process that in all cases precedes an actual
dispute between a taxpayer and the government. The tax return is
the taxpayer's report to the government of the financial transac-
tions engaged in during the year. It summarizes the taxpayer's
computation of tax liability and the information relating to trans-
actions which play a part in that computation."' Similarly, the in-
147. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
148. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
149. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 115, at 632; see also supra note 117 (discussing
the conclusion of the ABA Committee on Standards of Tax Practice with respect to
the adversarial nature of the tax compliance process).
150. See Falk, supra note 52, at 648 n.23 (stating that a tax return serves a
"disclosure, reporting and self-assessment function"); Handelman, supra note 109, at
90 (describing the tax return as a "disclosure and self-assessment document").
151. Questions regarding the adversarial nature of the return preparation process
are to some extent a function of the purpose of tax returns. On that subject, Profes-
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ternal revenue audit-a necessary compliment to the return prepa-
ration and filing process-offers the government the opportunity
to gather additional information necessary to confirm that the
treatment of transactions on the return is consistent with the inter-
nal revenue laws. 2 Both the tax return and the subsequent audit
are necessary steps in the tax compliance process; neither is part of
a forum for the resolution of disputes between taxpayers and the
IRS.
The ABA Section of Taxation described the return prepara-
tion process in much the same way in its 1984 Proposed Revision
to Formal Opinion 314:
To serve its disclosure and assessment function a tax re-
turn must provide a fair report of matters affecting tax li-
ability. The complications of the tax law, the inadequacy
of Internal Revenue Service audits, the impracticability of
training revenue agents to achieve expertness and the
flexibility available to the taxpayer in legitimately resolv-
ing to his own advantage numerous doubtful issues result-
ing from those complexities, impose a substantial burden
upon the government. 153
This description of the tax return preparation and compliance
sor Bittker offers the following:
At bottom, our difficulties in this area may stem from uncertainty about the
function of the federal income tax return: If we view it as expressing the
taxpayer's opinion of his legal liability, he has discharged his obligation to
the government by expressing his opinion honestly-by including those re-
ceipts that he honestly believes are taxable and excluding those he honestly
belheves are excludable, and so on with respect to deductions, credits, and
exemptions. If the return's function is viewed in this way, it seems to me
that the practitioner's obligations when he prepares a return is to insist that
it reflect his honest belief, based on his professional experience and skill,
and to the proper treatment of inclusions, exclusions, deductions, and so on,
based on the facts as he knows them. On the other hand, if the return is
viewed as a statement by the taxpayer of what the government ought to
know in order to make the most efficient use of its auditing facilities, then
the taxpayer ought to call attention to all debatable items, because these
are obviously the ones that would be most productive of revenue if sub-
jected to examination.
Bittker, Professional Responsibility, supra note 72, at 254. Compare Professor
Bittker's statement with:
"Well, I guess the question is how much obligation the taxpayer has to re-
veal all the things we are talking about if they add not very much at all to
the final declaration of tax liability. Should the burden not be on the tax
administrator to verify the taxpayer's claims by examination of his books
and records?"
Kurtz et al., supra note 87, at 19 (quoting panelist Bill Smith).
152- See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
153. Prop. Rev. to Op. 314, supra note 113, at 71 (citation omitted).
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testing process served as the basis for the Tax Section's conclusion
that "[a] tax return is not a submission in an adversary proceed-
ing.''4 The legal profession's failure to endorse the position ad-
vanced by the Tax Section 5 prompted the Treasury to endorse a
similar proposal in changes to the Rules of Practice circulated for
comment in 1986:
The area of tax return preparation and advice given with
respect to positions on tax returns clearly reflects a prac-
titioner's dual responsibility. A tax return is not a sub-
mission in an adversary proceedings [sic]. Rather, the tax
return serves a disclosure, reporting and self-assessment
function. It is a citizen's report to the government of his
or her relevant activities for the year. To serve its disclo-
sure and assessment function, a tax return must... pro-
vide a fair report of matters affecting tax liability. The
complexities of the tax and the limited number of tax re-
turn examinations the IRS is able to perform impose a
substantial burden upon the government. Hence, the rep-
resentations made on tax returns must accurately reflect
the facts, and positions taken on tax returns must be sup-
portable by the law.156
Both statements describe a compliance system that can function
properly only with the cooperation and assistance of taxpayers.
How then does the legal profession justify its continued support of
an adversarial approach to the return preparation process, an ap-
proach that encourages limited disclosure of information and
thereby undermines the government's effort to promote taxpayer
compliance? The ABA Committee on Standards of Tax Practice
addressed this question in its Task Force Report on Formal Opin-
ion 85-352:
[Formal Opinion 85-352] does not state that the general
ethical guidelines governing advocacy in litigation are de-
terminative, or suggest that tax returns are adversarial
proceedings. To the contrary, a tax return initially serves
a disclosure, reporting, and self-assessment function. It is
the citizen's report to the government of his or her rele-
154. Id.
155. See supra note 117 (discussing the reaffirmation by the ABA Ethics Commit-
tee of the adversarial nature of the return preparation and filing process in Formal
Opinion 85-352).
156. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 144, at 29, 113.
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vant activities for the year. The Opinion says that be-
cause some returns, particularly aggressive ones, may re-
sult in an adversary relationship, there is a place for con-
sideration of the ethical considerations regarding
advocacy. Thus, the Opinion blends the ethical guidelines
governing advocacy with those applicable to advising,
from which the new ethical standard is derived. 15
The Task Force Report offers an equally accurate description of
the tax compliance process but fails to explain the legal profes-
sion's continued support in Formal Opinion 85-352 for the charac-
teristically adversarial attitude of both taxpayer and tax lawyer to-
ward disclosure of positions on tax returns in an admittedly
nonadversarial setting.5 Thus, the legal profession refuses to ac-
knowledge that the use of partisan advocacy-an approach to tax-
payer representation that leads to limited disclosure on tax re-
turns-is inconsistent with both the nature and purpose of the tax
compliance system.
Similarly, lawyers are unwilling to relinquish their role as ad-
vocate during representation of taxpayers involved in internal
revenue audits. Admittedly, the case for partisan advocacy is
more persuasive in the context of an audit, if only because of the
presence of an IRS agent representing the interests of the govern-
ment. 9 Undoubtedly, it is this difference between return prepa-
ration and return examination that justifies the more cautious ap-
proach taken by the ABA Section of Taxation in commentary on
the nature of the audit process: "It may be that upon commence-
ment of an audit Internal Revenue Agents take adversarial posi-
tions, despite formal admonitions to operate 'in a fair and impar-
tial manner, with neither a government nor a taxpayer point of
view.' But prior to commencement of such an adversarial relation-
157. Task Force Report, supra note 112, at 640.
158. See Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 95 n.88.
The [Task Force] Report acknowledges that the opinion authorizes report-
ing, without disclosure, positions that the lawyer has concluded and advised
the client the courts would reject if forthrightly advanced. Only by assum-ing the stance as adversary could a lawyer justify advising a client thus in-
formed to report the position without similarly advising the Service.
Id (citation omitted).
159. The government's enhanced ability to protect its interests during the exami-
nation process must also contribute to the lack of attention paid to partisan advocacy
in this setting. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
advantages enjoyed by the government during examination of a return.
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ship different considerations apply."1" Examining agents, who as-
sume the role of government advocate, may invite an adversarial
response from taxpayers and their representatives. However, an
agent's departure from the IRS guidelines does not justify rechar-
acterization of an otherwise nonadversarial process. The purpose
of the internal revenue audit is to confirm compliance, not to re-
solve disputes. Disputes between taxpayers and the government
are the product of the audit process. Nevertheless, the possibility
of a dispute does not justify an adversarial approach to the audit
process and the resulting lack of cooperation that undermines the
effectiveness of the compliance testing system."'
In view of the legal profession's natural reluctance to abandon
traditional adversarial representation of taxpayers, it is necessary
to explore further the nature of the tax compliance process and its
relationship to traditional adversarial proceedings. Despite its
nonadversarial nature, is the tax compliance process sufficiently
similar to a traditional adversarial proceeding to justify the unco-
operative attitude of private litigants adopted by the taxpayer and
the tax lawyer? Or is the return preparation and examination
process so different, both in form and purpose, that continued use
of adversarial representation cannot be justified? The issues
raised by these questions are considered in the discussion that fol-
lows on the application of adversary theory in the tax compliance
setting.
2. The return preparation and examination process as an
adversarial proceeding
Use of the adversary model is premised on the existence of a
dispute between parties that is best resolved by an impartial deci-
sion-maker who relies on information presented by the parties to
160. See Prop. Rev. to Op. 314, supra note 113, at 71.
161. See Falk, supra note 52, at 648 (addressing the submission of returns).
The disclosure and self-assessment purposes of tax returns more cogently
explain the view of tax submissions as nonadversarial. Our system of tax
returns depends heavily upon fair dealing with the government. Paying
taxes is not a battle aiming at the government's defeat. Rather, it is a col-
lective obligation of citizenship. Failure to obey the law can result in an ad-
versarial proceeding, but obeying the law is something one does for the
government, not against it.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Gordon L. Gidlund, Voluntary Compliance and the
Taxman's Friend: Points to Consider When Criminal Investigation Follows Tax
Audit, 67 TAXES 513, 514 (1989) (suggesting that the return examination process
should be cooperative rather than adversarial).
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render a decision and thereby resolve the dispute. 2 Partisan-
ship-and the resulting unwillingness of one party to cooperate
with another-is a necessary product of the need to provide the
decision-maker with the benefits of a thorough examination of the
facts surrounding the dispute without jeopardizing impartiality
through active participation.'o Judges presiding over adversary
proceedings use procedural rules to police partisanship and ensure
that information provided by the parties is both relevant and reli-
able.16 Together, these elements of the adversary system provide
the parties and the decision-maker with the benefits of advocacy
while minimizing the negative impact of partisanship.6
The IRS serves as the decision-maker in the context of the tax
return preparation and examination process.'6 Although the role
of decision-maker does not require the IRS to resolve a dispute-
an actual dispute of the type contemplated by the adversary sys-
tem does not arise until the examining agent challenges a return
position on which the taxpayer is unwilling to concede-it never-
theless places the government in the position of evaluating the
propriety of positions taken by the taxpayer on a return. The IRS
is not, however, an impartial and passive decision-maker. 67 In-
deed, the IRS, represented by the examining agent, is an active
decision-maker as well as a partisan opponent. s The IRS con-
ducts its own investigation much like the judge in inquisitorial pro-
162. See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
164. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 11 (stating that the lawyer can be confident that
the negative impact of partisanship will be addressed by a decision-maker so that the
rights of other parties are not prejudiced); Pound, supra note 17, at 738 ("Hence in
America we take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere umpire, to
pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the game, and that the parties
should fight out their own game in their own way without judicial interference.").
165. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
166. As noted:
Examination's authority to resolve issues is derived from its authority to
make determinations of tax liability under IRC [§] 6201. It has broad
authority to consider and weigh conflicting factual information, data, and
opinions. Using professional judgment in accordance with auditing stan-
dards, it makes findings of fact and applies Service position on issues of law
to determine the correct tax liability.
Phil Brand, IRS Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques, 71 TAx NoTES 529, 532
(1996) (citation omitted); see also supra notes 99-101 (discussing the adversarial re-
lationship between the taxpayer and the IRS).
167. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
168. See New York City Bar Report, supra note 57, at 876 ("A tax dispute is
heard initially by an agency whose employees are frequently no more objective than
taxpayers .... ).
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ceedings and therefore is not forced to rely exclusively on the par-
ties to provide all information needed to resolve issues. In addi-
tion, the dual role of the government as both decision-maker and
opponent precludes the IRS from enjoying the benefits of the par-
tisan debate between adversaries contemplated by the adversary
system.'69 These differences between the tax compliance system
and traditional adversarial proceedings suggest that the use of
partisan advocacy cannot be justified by analogy to the traditional
adversarial system used for the resolution of disputes.
But the absence of an impartial decision-maker does not pre-
clude the use of adversarial representation in other settings. In the
case of private negotiations, for example, the use of partisanship is
premised on the fact that overzealousness will neither benefit nor
harm either party. In theory, when adversarial conduct becomes
intolerable, the resulting impasse sends both parties in search of
other opportunities. In the remaining cases the interest in estab-
lishing and maintaining a relationship keeps adversarial attitudes
in check. Unlike negotiations between private parties, however,
disputes between taxpayers and the IRS do not arise out of a mu-
tually beneficial relationship that encourages the parties to avoid
abuse of the adversary system. There is no "stalemate" safe har-
bor available to assure both parties that an unreasonable approach
taken by one or the other can result in no worse than maintaining
the status quo. Indeed, a stalemate during examination of a return
can result in the issuance of a revenue agent's report recommend-
ing changes in the taxpayer's return and the assessment of addi-
tional tax.7 ° Although rules of conduct make some attempt to ad-
dress the potential for abuse of the adversarial process by IRS
personnel 1 and taxpayer advocates,'72 these rules, even if en-
169. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
170. See Bittker, Representing Taxpayers, supra note 95, at 271 ("In view of the
revenue agent's undisputed authority to ask questions, to issue subpoenas, and to
assess a deficiency if he is not satisfied with what he has learned, I see no ground for
insisting upon the kind of disclosure that some commentators seem to demand.").
171. See Karin Skadden, Accounting News, 37 TAx NOTEs 835, 837 (1987)
(suggesting that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights included in Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1989 will serve as a Code of Conduct for the IRS); see also Lawrence
B. Gibbs, Tax Reform: An Opportunity for a Fresh Start in Tax Administration, 6
AM. J. TAx PoL'Y 1 (1987) (containing remarks by IRS Commissioner Lawrence B.
Gibbs regarding review of the IRS professional and ethical standards to improve re-
lations between the taxpayer and the IRS); John D. Johnson, The IRS Commitment
to Professional Ethics, 7 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 105 (1988) (containing remarks by Assis-
tant IRS Commissioner John D. Johnson regarding improving the quality of tax ad-
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forced, cannot supply the more effective cooperative attitude pres-
ent in the private sector by reason of the desire to establish and
preserve a relationship.
That is not to say that some form of partisanship does not
have its place in negotiations between the taxpayer and the IRS.
In order to maximize the likelihood of a correct decision, the tax
compliance system should provide the IRS, as decision-maker,
with access to all information, theories, and arguments relevant to
the issue under consideration."3 Because the partisan presenta-
tions made by participants in adversarial proceedings have proven
to be one of the most useful sources of information available to the
decision-maker, 4 this aspect of partisanship should prove equally
valuable to the IRS when considering return positions. However,
other consequences associated with the use of partisan advocacy-
specifically the uncooperative attitude of participants and the re-
sulting reluctance to share information that is characteristic of ad-
versary proceedings-must be considered separately to ensure that
the IRS obtains similarly beneficial results. 7
The competitive and uncooperative attitude of parties in-
volved in adversarial dispute resolution is largely the product of
party participation and control, the other fundamental character-
istic of adversarial proceedings. Motivated by a desire to prevail,
each party prepares its best case, a process that includes withhold-
ing information from the opponent in an effort to enhance the
likelihood of success.Y The adversary model assumes that each
party is equally capable of representing its own interests and there-
fore relies on the competitive nature of the process to ensure that
one party's reluctance to share information is addressed by an
ministration).
172. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
173. But see Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672 ("Negotiation and settlement
procedures of the tax system do not carry with them the guarantee that a correct tax
result necessarily occurs. The latter happens, if at all, solely by reason of chance in
settlement of tax controversies just as it might happen with regard to other civil dis-
putes.").
174. See supra note 12.
175. See Frankel, Search, supra note 12, at 1057-59 (proposing that all facts the
lawyer does not intend to introduce as evidence should be disclosed to the court and
opposing counsel); Posner, supra note 42, at 112 ("Once the facts and the law have
been presented ... the lawyers are free to zealously advocate the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to their clients, and may
challenge the applicability or the soundness of any unfavorable law.").
176. See supra notes 16-18, 21-22 and accompanying text
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equally effective investigation conducted by the opponent 7 In
practice, however, litigants are rarely so evenly matched that the
uncooperative attitude of one is fully offset by the abilities of the
other. 8 For that reason, every adversarial proceeding utilizes dis-
covery rules and other procedural devices designed to minimize
the negative effect of partisanship. 179 Indeed, the importance of
free access to information in federal court proceedings is illus-
trated by the recent addition of mandatory disclosure require-
ments to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure1 O Thus, the use of partisanship in the tax return prepa-
ration and examination setting can be justified only by taking
similar steps to protect both the taxpayer and the government
from the effects of partisan 
advocacy.p 
Like the parties in traditional adversary proceedings, the par-
ticipants involved in the tax compliance process are not evenly
matched. The nature of the task confronting the IRS, ' together
with the challenges faced by the agency in attracting, training, and
retaining employees, have led some to characterize the agency as
177. Cf. LANDSMAN, supra note 7, at 4 (commenting that lawyers who fail to carry
out their duty as advocates undermine the adversary process); Fuller & Randall, su-
pra note 6, at 1216 (noting that adjudication is neither fair nor effective when only
one party is represented by counsel).
178. See supra note 27.
179. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
180. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (mandating disclosure of specified types of
information without regard to whether a request for such information has been is-
sued by another party). This change in the federal discovery rules was prompted, in
part, by recommendations made by scholars regarding the need for a voluntary dis-
closure rule. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery:
A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1348-61 (1978); Wil-
liam W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Re-
form, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703 (1989).
181. See IRS PENALTY TASK FORCE STUDY (1989), reprinted in IRS Task Force
Release Penalty Reform Proposals, 89 TAx NOTES TODAY 45-36 (Feb. 27, 1989)
[hereinafer IRS STUDY].
A taxpayer who takes a position without believing that it is correct is using
his return as a first step in an adversary process. As in any court proceed-
ing, he should tell his adversary ... what the issue is that needs to be re-
solved. This information is important so that the issue can be directly ad-
dressed and so that it is not avoided either because the return is not audited
or because the issue is not found.
Id.
182- See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
183. See N. Jerold Cohen, It Always Looks Better When You Look Back, 46 TAx
LAw. 683, 686 (1993) ("[The IRS] has been plagued [during the past decade] by the
loss of middle level, experienced agents. With this loss of experience has come a de-
terioration in the quality of audits .... ).
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an unfairly equipped opponent. 84 Naturally, taxpayer advocates
respond by noting that the government's resources and ability as
decision-maker to endorse its own position more than make up for
any advantage the taxpayer may enjoy through the use of partisan-
ship and the resulting ability to control information."' While there
is some truth in both positions, the fact remains that the taxpayer
and the IRS are not the evenly matched opponents contemplated
by the adversary model.-
8 6
Surprisingly, the tax compliance system addresses the prob-
lems of partisanship by departing from the adversary system's so-
lution to party inequality. Rather than adopt a policy of full dis-
closure-a policy furthered in adversary proceedings by the rules
of discovery-the tax return preparation and examination process
permits taxpayers to withhold information on most return posi-
tions from the government through nondisclosure on a retur ' 8
and through the refusal to volunteer information during an audit.'88
The government's complex audit selection process and the seem-
ingly limitless ability of the IRS to collect information from a tax-
payer during examination of the return may offset to some extent
the obvious advantage enjoyed by the taxpayer through informa-
tion control. However, these tools do not assist in the identifica-
184. See Steven J. Willis, Masks, Magic, and Games: The Use of Tax Law as a
Policy Tool, 4 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 41, 59 (1985) (describing the IRS as an unrepre-
sented opponent); see also Falk, supra note 52, at 647-48 (noting that the nonadver-
sarial proposal advanced by the ABA Section of Taxation was based, in part, on the
premise that "because the government is not a fairly equipped opponent, a tax re-
turn is not governed by the usual rules of adversary proceedings.").
185. See supra note 170. Compare, however, the following:
[S]ome non-criminal matters, such as administrative hearings, can raise the
same issues of the state versus subjects and should be treated similarly; we
may call these "quasi-criminal" matters. It makes sense for this reason to
speak of the "criminal defense paradigm" rather than simply the "criminal
defense context." The criminal defense paradigm includes any litigation
context in which zealous advocacy is justified by virtue of the fact that we
have political reasons to aim at prophylactic protection from the state, even
at the expense of justice.
LUBAN, supra note 6, at 63.
186. In their proposal to revise Formal Opinion 314, the ABA Tax Section ad-
dressed this issue:
The lawyer should then represent his client's interests, consistent with the
Rules of the [Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)] and with the
preamble to the MRPC, which provides that "when an opposing party is
well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client
and at the same time assume that justice is being done."
Prop. Rev. to Op. 314, supra note 113, at 74.
187. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
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tion of issues hidden on the return through nondisclosure. Unlike
a plaintiff in a civil action who must plead in a manner designed to
alert the opponent to the issues raised by the cause of action,"' the
taxpayer is rarely required to call to the government's attention
the issues raised by positions taken on a return.19° Consequently,
the government's ability to eliminate the advantage enjoyed by the
taxpayer is limited. It arises in those situations where the examin-
ing agent successfully identifies issues hidden on a return and pro-
ceeds with an investigation of those issues by soliciting information
from the taxpayer through an inquiry and an administrative sum-
mons when necessary.' If an examining agent fails to identify
hidden positions on a return,192 the taxpayer escapes detection and
thereby secures an advantage that the rules of discovery attempt to
eliminate in traditional adversarial proceedings.193
189. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-47 (1957) (holding that a party is re-
quired to plead in a manner sufficient to alert opponent to the issues raised by the
claims asserted).
190. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text; see also Corneel, supra note
108, at 305 ("It is appropriate to assist the client in structuring a transaction and re-
porting it on the return in the way least likely to be subject to audit, provided we do
not mislead the Service.").
191. See I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1)-(2) (1994) (authorizing use of the administrative
summons and a means of providing the government with access to relevant records
and testimony); id. § 7609 (authorizing use of third-party summons). For a detailed
examination of the Service's use of the administrative summons, see SALTZMAN, su-
pra note 71, 13.01.
192. Recognizing that a position taken on a return will not be challenged unless
the return is audited, lawyer and taxpayer play the audit lottery by engaging in
"creative disclosure"-the inclusion of information on the return in a manner that
satisfies the obligation to disclose without calling attention to the position and risk-
ing audit. See Falk, supra note 52, at 648 n.21 ("Because the great preponderance of
returns are not audited, the taxpayer's reporting position is necessarily relied on by
the Internal Revenue Service and is rarely in fact subjected to adversarial review.")
(quoting Letter from James B. Lewis, Chairman, ABA Section of Taxation, to Rob-
ert 0. Hetledge, ABA Ethics Committee (June 4, 1985)); Kurtz et al., supra note 87,
at 15 ("[It is] very difficult to run a tax system with a small audit coverage, and with
the complexities that we have in our system, where that transaction then gets buried
with thousands of others on a return .... " (quoting IRS Commissioner Jerome
Kurtz)).
193. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text. However, in criminal proceed-
ings the adversary system intentionally creates an advantage in favor of the accused.
See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 60 ("We want to handicap the state in its power even
legitimately to punish us, for we believe as a matter of political theory and historical
experience that if the state is not handicapped or restrained ex ante, our political and
civil liberties are jeopardized."); Schwartz, Zeal, supra note 5, at 155-56 (describing
differences between the criminal and civil litigation systems and the concern over
conviction of the innocent that justifies the duties and burdens imposed on prosecu-
tors).
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Finally, the adversary model contemplates that each party will
maximize the likelihood of success by presenting its best case and
by challenging the positions taken by the opponent. 4 But similar
debate occurs only in very limited situations within the tax compli-
ance system. For example, during preparation of the return, the
IRS cannot scrutinize the taxpayer's positions. 95 Similarly, during
examination of a return, the IRS's ability to scrutinize taxpayer
positions is handicapped by limitations placed on the scope of the
audit,9 ' the agent's success in identifying undisclosed return posi-
tions,'97 and the complexity and sophistication of the taxpayer po-
sitions that often push agents beyond their limited training and ex-
perience.9 '
In theory, the examining agent has the ability to overcome
many of these obstacles. The agent can address limited disclosure
on returns during the audit with specific inquiries as well as a se-
ries of general questions designed to identify unreported income
194. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
195. See Durst, supra note 87, at 1034 (stating that the "hallmark of an adversarial
proceeding" is the opposing counsel's critical scrutiny of all of the lawyer's state-
ments, which explains the low disclosure standard even though chances are low that
a tax return will ever be critically scrutinized); Rowen, supra note 96, at 249 ("The
premise of the adversary system, that the two adversaries will be in an equal position
to uncover and present the facts, is unrealistic as applied to the current tax system.");
see also Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions, supra note 111, at 975 (stating that
the practitioner has a duty to help the taxpayer fulfill the reporting obligation but
violates this duty by encouraging noncompliant conduct); Kurtz, supra note 58, at 60
(stating that taxpayers often put the most favorable interpretation on questionable
issues due to the voluntary compliance system).
196. See Kurtz et al., supra note 87, at 15 ("[A]s the taxpayer's financial matters
become more extensive and complex, the audit itself, while it may be done with fre-
quency, is only a sampling of transactions-it is not an audit of 100% of the transac-
tions." (quoting IRS Commissioner Jerome Kurtz)); Rowen, supra note 96, at 249
(noting that the scope of audits is narrow because of limited government resources);
see also infra note 203 (discussing comprehensive Taxpayer Compliance Measure-
ment Program (TCMP) audits).
197. See Rowen, supra note 96, at 249.
The premise of the adversary system, that the two adversaries will be in an
equal position to uncover and present the facts, is unrealistic as applied to
the current tax system. While the government's disadvantage is overcome
somewhat by the rule that places the burden of proof on the taxpayer, this
rule only applies when an issue has been raised; it does not help the gov-
ernment to uncover the issue.
Id
198. See SALTZMAN, supra note 71, 8.05(1)(b); Rowen, supra note 96, at 249
("While the government has many able agents, it is unrealistic to think that the gov-
ernment can adequately instruct all of its agents in the complexities of the law in
such a manner that they can uncover most doubtful questions.").
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and items inconsistent with the taxpayer's lifestyle.199 The agent
may respond to incomplete responses and uncooperative taxpayers
by issuing an administrative summons2 0 or may simply resolve all
doubt in favor of the government by rejecting the taxpayer's posi-
tion and shifting the burden of proof to the taxpayer on appeal.
21
These information-gathering and procedural tools have their
place, to be sure. However, their effectiveness depends upon the
agent's ability to identify issues requiring investigation, a task
made more difficult by the taxpayer's decision to hide question-
able positions on a return.20 Because an undisclosed return posi-
tion appears on a return like any other transaction-conspicuous
perhaps by its subject matter but not by its questionable nature-
identification of these in the absence of a comprehensive audit of
taxpayer transactions is the exception rather than the rule 3
Differences between the tax compliance system and tradi-
tional adversary proceedings notwithstanding, the legal profession
insists that the use of partisan advocacy is both justified and neces-
sary. The government is a formidable opponent. It has seemingly
199. See generally SALTZMAN, supra note 71, 8.06 (describing the service proce-
dures for field examinations); Haims, supra note 71, § 24.04[6], at 24-15 (describing
the "economic reality audit," which is designed to consider the lifestyles and net
worth of self-employed taxpayers); William L. Raby & Burgess J. W. Raby, Financial
Status Audits-The Sound and The Fury, 71 TAx NoTES 515 (1996) (discussing IRS
economic reality program).
200. See Haims, supra note 71, § 24.09[3][c], at 24-37 (discussing IRS summons
power); see also supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing when an adminis-
trative summons is appropriate).
201. See generally Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting
the Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239 (1988) (discussing a pro-
posed shift in the burden of proof from the taxpayer to the IRS). The issue of bur-
den of proof has been the subject of considerable debate in recent years, prompting
lawmakers to propose legislation that would shift the burden of proof to the IRS.
The most recent proposal offered by 1996 presidential candidate Bob Dole is sum-
marized in Sheryl Stratton, Shifting the Burden of Proof to the IRS: Considering the
Possibilities, 72 TAX NOTES 1328 (1996).
202. See supra notes 86, 198.
203. The only truly comprehensive audit conducted by the IRS occurs in the con-
text of the controversial TCMP, a program designed to gather information from the
results of detailed audits for the purpose of revising the Discriminant Income Func-
tion (DIF) used in the complex computer-assisted process of selecting returns for
audit. See George Guttman, Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program" Is It
Necessary?, 67 TAx NOTES 1282 (1995) (discussing the history of TCMP, its uses,
limitations, and future); see generally SALTZMAN, supra note 71, 91 8.03 n.8 (referring
to the service's procedures in the TCMP); 1973-1992 RESEARCH, supra note 65, at
13-14 (explaining how the IRS gathers its estimates of underpaid income through the
TCMP); Dubin et al., Tax Cheaters, supra note 72, at 241 (discussing the small
amount of empirical work concerning tax compliance).
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unlimited resources and technical expertise plus the unique ability
as decision-maker to pass judgment on taxpayer's return positions.
This enormous advantage must be countered with partisan advo-
cacy if the taxpayer is to have any chance of success.
What is it about the IRS that warrants this level of concern
over the rights of the individual? Clearly, the agency's dual role as
opponent and decision-maker makes it a unique adversary. Fur-
ther, the IRS becomes particularly imposing when individuals
within the agency stray from the IRS's mission statement by
abusing their discretionary authority.05 Abuse of power during the
internal revenue audit-asking unnecessary or irrelevant ques-
tions, unwarranted use of the administrative summons, threatening
unjustifiable assessments or action against a taxpayer or tax prac-
titioner to gain advantage during an audit-threatens the rights of
taxpayers, the livelihood of tax practitioners, and the reputation
and effectiveness of the taxing system.0 6 However, concern over
the possible abuse of governmental power during the examination
of a return does not justify action taken by the taxpayer to avoid
the audit process altogether. Furthermore, the use of partisan ad-
vocacy during the audit of a return does not further the goal of
limiting the abuse that arguably justifies its use; it merely enhances
the taxpayer's chances of success by default. Effective measures
taken to address concerns over the potential for abuse of govern-
mental power during the examination process would expose the
use of partisanship in this setting as no more than an advantage
204. See supra note 185. However, some contend that the stakes are higher dur-
ing an audit because disclosure may be sufficient to trigger a criminal investigation,
leaving the taxpayer with no information to withhold in the interest of avoiding self-
incrimination. See Kutak, supra note 14, at 177 (describing the state as an opponent
with a "monopoly of coercive power within the community" and acknowledging the
"enormous resources [available] to exercise that power"). See generally Bittker,
Federal Income Tax, supra note 80 (discussing the public's right to know and the in-
dividual's right to privacy); Gidlund, supra note 161 (providing guidelines for when a
tax audit leads to a criminal investigation).
205. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also Brian Erard, The Influence
of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES, supra note 73, at
95, 96 (speculating that the IRS can encourage future compliance by treating taxpay-
ers fairly); Gibbs, supra note 62, at 6 (stating that the IRS must be "'as ready to rec-
ognize the rights of the taxpayer as we are to protect the rights of the Government"'
(quoting IRS Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs)).
206. Cf I.R.S. Policy Statement P-6-10 (Nov. 26, 1979) 1 INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL: ADMINSTRATION (CCH) 1218-19 ("Internal Revenue Service officials and
employees must bear in mind that the public impact of their official actions can have
an effect on respect for tax laws and on voluntary compliance far beyond the limits
of a particular issue or case.").
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enjoyed by the individual at the expense of the system.
2 7
IV. TAX RETURN DISCLOSURE: DEFINING THE DUTIES OF
TAXPAYERS AND TAX LAWYERS
Because the tax return preparation and examination process
does not fit within the adversary model, applicable rules should
redefine the relationship between the taxpayer, the tax advisor,
and the IRS as nonadversarial. This simple declaration follows
from the preceding analysis and should be embraced as a funda-
mental tenet upon which to base the duties of taxpayers and their
advisors. Realistically, however, such a statement will have little
effect on the conduct of those engaged in the preparation and ex-
amination of tax returns. A declaration is a useful first step, to be
sure. However, the need for an effective and efficient taxpayer
compliance testing system demands that more be done to prevent
taxpayers and their representatives from legitimately misleading
the IRS about the nature of return positions.
A change in the disclosure standard applicable to taxpayers
can and should address the threat posed by a taxpayer's failure to
disclose questionable return positions. The proposal described
below explores the problem of limited disclosure in the context of
a new standard that would require adequate disclosure of infor-
mation relating to any return position not supported by all relevant
existing authorities. The proposal also addresses the need for
changes in the standards applicable to tax practitioners, given their
ability to influence the behavior of their clients and the relation-
ship of practitioner standards to taxpayer standards. The process
that emerges from these proposed changes would remain some-
what adversarial but also would minimize the negative effects of
partisanship. Therefore, this process would ensure that both tax-
payers and the IRS are in a position to consider the issues raised
by return positions and engage in a debate that promotes taxpayer
compliance.
207. The resources available for use by the examining agent during audit of a re-
turn are, in large part, a response to the uncooperative approach taken by taxpayers
during preparation and examination of returns. The agent has little need for the
administrative summons and the power to assess and shift the burden of proof to the
taxpayer when dealing with a taxpayer who is forthcoming with all relevant informa-
tion. Thus, the taxpayer's adversarial attitude, the government's power to compel
discovery, and the government's power to shift the burden to the taxpayer all seem
to respond to each other. Elimination of these would enhance taxpayer compliance
and address concerns over the possible abuse of governmental power.
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A. A Proposal for a Higher Taxpayer Disclosure Standard
Currently, the substantial understatement penalty included in
the accuracy-related penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code encourages disclosure of supplemental information relating
to return positions.0 8 This penalty provision utilizes a standard
based on the concept of "substantial authority" to identify return
positions for which supplemental disclosure is necessary. 09 A tax-
payer need not disclose return positions supported by substantial
authority in order to protect against imposition of the penalty.
20
However, when a taxpayer reports a position on a return that is
not supported by substantial authority and the position results in a
substantial understatement of income tax,211 the accuracy-related
penalty is imposed unless the position satisfies the recently
adopted "reasonable basis" standard2&1 2 and is adequately disclosed
213on the return. The purpose of the substantial understatement
208. See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-1(b) (as amended in
1995).
209. For a discussion of the meaning of "substantial authority" see infra notes
214-20 and accompanying text.
210. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(1) (as amended in
1995) ("If there is substantial authority for the tax treatment of an item, the item is
treated as if it were shown properly on the return for the taxable year in computing
the amount of the tax shown on the return.").
211. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (defining "substantial understatement of income
tax" as an understatement exceeding the "greater of-(i) 10 percent of the tax re-
quired to be shown on the return.., or (ii) $5,000").
212. See id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(e)(2)(i) (as amended in
1995) (stating that the disclosure exception is not effective in the absence of a rea-
sonable basis for the position). The reasonable basis standard was added to the ac-
curacy related penalty provision of the Internal Revenue Code in 1993 in an effort to
elevate the reporting standard applicable to taxpayers. See H.R. REP. No. 103-111,
at 754 (1993), reprinted in 1993-3 C.B. 167, 330 ("The committee believes that the
'frivolous' standard does not sufficiently discourage taxpayers and preparers from
taking unreasonable return positions. Accordingly, to encourage compliance, the
committee believes that a tougher standard should be imposed."); cf Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1995) (disclosure of position not supported by reason-
able basis does not preclude imposition of accuracy related penalty for disregard of
the rules and regulations).
213. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(I); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(a) (as
amended in 1995) (understatement of income tax reduced by that portion for which
there is adequate disclosure). The Treasury Regulations include detailed rules on
what constitutes adequate disclosure for purposes of the accuracy related penalty
and the I.R.C. § 6694 preparer penalty. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(f) (as amended in
1995); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1992). One commentator sug-
gests that disclosure is adequate only when it accomplishes the objective of alerting
the IRS to a questionable return position. See John Andr6 LeDuc, The Legislative
Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottery, and Other Forms of
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penalty provision is sound: provide taxpayers with an economic
incentive to disclose information on questionable return positions.
However, the effectiveness of the standard-its ability to promote
behavior that minimizes the misleading effects of nondisclosure-
largely depends upon the meaning assigned to the term
"substantial authority."
The Treasury Department's regulations define "substantial
authority" as an objective standard applied through a considera-
tion of law and relevant facts.214 In an attempt to quantify the
standard, the regulations compare "substantial authority" to other
standards with established definitions:
The substantial authority standard is less stringent than
the "more likely than not" standard (the standard that is
met when there is a greater than 50-percent likelihood of
the position being upheld), but more stringent than the
reasonable basis standard (the standard which, if satisfied,
generally will prevent imposition of the penalty under
section 6662(b)(1) for negligence).215
According to the regulations, substantial authority supports a re-
turn position only if "the weight of the authorities supporting the
treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities
supporting contrary treatment., 21 '6 The regulations adopt a broad
definition of "authority" for this purpose217 and assign greater or
Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTEs 363, 386 (1983) [hereinafter
LeDuc, Legislative Response] ("Taxpayers need only ask themselves whether an IRS
agent, knowing the law, who read the return and associated disclosure, could recog-
nize the issue raised.").
214. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (as amended in 1995).
215. Id.; cf I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i)(II) (noting that substantial authority does
not apply to returns relating to tax shelters unless the taxpayer reasonably believed
that the tax treatment of such item was more likely than not the proper treatment);
31 C.F.R. § 10.33(a)(4) (1995) (using the "more likely than not standard" in the con-
text of return positions relating to tax shelters).
216. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 1995). The regulations add
that auditors consider all relevant authorities, including those unsupportive of the
taxpayer's treatment of the position, when determining the existence of substantial
authority. See id,
217. The regulations define "authority" for purposes of the substantial authority
standard as including only the following:
App!icable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and other statutory
provsins; proposed, temporary and final regulations construing such stat-
ues [sic]; revenue rulings and revenue procedures; tax treaties and regula-
tions thereunder, and Treasury Department and other official explanation
of such treaties; court cases; congressional intent as reflected in committee
reports, joint explanatory statements of managers included in conference
committee reports, and floor statements made prior to enactment by one of
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lesser weight to authorities based on a variety of factors including
the nature of the authority, its age, and the similarity of facts con-
sidered by the authority to the position taken by the taxpayer.2 18
Indeed, the regulations acknowledge the significance of decisions
rendered by the U.S. circuit courts of appeals in a special rule; this
rule treats the substantial authority standard as satisfied in the case
of a position supported by a decision issued by the circuit court to
which the taxpayer has a right of appeal.2 9 Using these guidelines,
taxpayers and their advisors must weigh the authorities both for
and against every return position and conclude objectively on the
existence of substantial authority before deciding on how that po-
sition should be reported on the taxpayer's return.220
a bill's managers; General Explanations of tax legislation prepared by the
Joint Committee on Taxation (the Blue Book); private letter rulings and
technical advice memoranda issued after October 31, 1976; actions on deci-
sions and general counsel memoranda issued after March 12, 1981 (as well
as general counsel memoranda published in pre-1955 volumes of the Cumu-
lative Bulletin); Internal Revenue Service information or press releases;
and notices, announcements and other administrative pronouncements
published by the Service in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. Conclusions
reached in treatises, legal periodicals, legal opinions or opinions rendered
by tax professionals are not authority.
Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1995); see Gwen Thayer Handelman, Law
and Order Comes to "Dodge City": Treasury's New Return Preparer and IRS Prac-
tice Standards, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 631, 631-32 (1993) [hereinafter Handelman,
Law & Order] (endorsing the Treasury's use of legal realism in the context of revi-
sions to the preparer penalty provisions and Treasury Circular 230); cf. William L.
Raby, Circular 230 Still Leaves Gaps Between the Profession and the IRS, 57 TAx
NOTEs 511, 512 (1992) (suggesting that the authorities omitted from the definition of"authority" may nevertheless be relevant when considering whether a practitioner's
conduct violates the standard established for return preparers under I.R.C. § 6694).
218. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1995) (according revenue
rulings greater weight than private letter rulings).
[A] case or revenue ruling having some facts in common with the tax treat-
ment at issue is not particularly relevant if the authority is materially distin-
guishable on its facts, or is otherwise inapplicable to the tax treatment at is-
sue. An authority that merely states a conclusion ordinarily is less
persuasive than one that reaches its conclusion by cogently relating the
applicable law to pertinent facts.
id.
219. See id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(B) (as amended in 1995); cf. Golsen v. Commis-
sioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970) (stating that the Tax Court will follow prior decisions of
the circuit court of appeals to which the case is appealable). Because taxpayers may
bring refund suits in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, this rule also applies to deci-
sions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the circuit court hearing
appeals from the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994)
(granting jurisdiction over refund cases to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims); id. §
1295(a)(3) (giving exclusive jurisdiction to U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit for appeals from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims).
220. Because substantial authority is an objective test, the taxpayer's belief that
there is substantial authority for a position is irrelevant. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
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Problematically, the substantial authority standard establishes
a threshold that is too low to ensure the disclosure of all positions
in which the government has a legitimate interest. Because
authority in support of a position qualifies as substantial even
when the position has less than a fifty percent chance of being up-
held, 2 1 many positions on which the government could prevail re-
main outside the scope of this penalty provision. In fairness to the
government, it could modify the standard to permit nondisclosure
only in situations where the taxpayer's chance of prevailing is
greater than fifty percent.22 Setting aside the unavoidable debate
over the ability of taxpayers and tax practitioners to predict accu-
rately the chances of success, even this higher standard denies the
government access to information on positions that, while ques-
tionable from the government's standpoint, nevertheless may
merit debate. Supreme Court decisions addressing questions
raised by the internal revenue laws-particularly those questions
considered by the Court in response to disagreements among the
circuit courts of appeal-affirm the importance of allowing both
taxpayers and the IRS to advance positions contrary to established
authority.
In order to provide the government with the information
needed to test for taxpayer compliance and, when appropriate,
to advance its own valid but debatable positions, the rules
should require disclosure of return positions whenever any rec-
ognized authority exists that is contrary to the taxpayer's posi-
tion. The rules and regulations should limit "recognized
authority" for this purpose to those currently used in determin-
4(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 1995). However, if a taxpayer takes an undisclosed posi-
tion that results in an underpayment of tax, the IRS will not impose a substantial un-
derstatement penalty if there was reasonable cause for the underpayment and the
taxpayer acted in good faith. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1). For a discussion of this
"reasonable cause... [and] in good faith" exception, see infra note 238.
221. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
222. See Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 342 (noting that a
"more likely than not" standard could be used to enhance the effectiveness of the
substantial understatement penalty).
223. See, e.g., Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984) (resolving in the
government's favor a conflict between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967) (resolving in the govern-
ment's favor a conflict between the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals); Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964) (resolving in the government's
favor a conflict between the Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals); Commis-
sioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959) (resolving in the government's favor a conflict
between the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals).
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ing whether a return position satisfies the substantial authority
standard.' Used in the context of the substantial understate-
ment penalty provision, this standard requires adequate disclo-
sure of information relating to questionable return positions.
To accomplish disclosure, the government subjects taxpayers to
a penalty for a substantial understatement of income tax attrib-
utable to an undisclosed return position for which any recog-
nized authority exists that is not supportive of the taxpayer's
position. Incorporation of this standard into the existing sub-
stantial understatement penalty provision would result in the
following change to § 6662(d)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue
Code:
(B) REDUCTION FOR UNDERSTATEMENT DUE TO POSITION
OF TAXPAYER OR DISCLOSED ITEM-The amount of the under-
statement under subparagraph (A) shall be reduced by that
portion of the understatement which is attributable to-
(i) the tax treatment of any item by the taxpayer if there is
or was n -g.j . d 5bstaiitial authority for  such
treatment, or
(ii) any item if-
(I) the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are
adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to
the return, and
(H) there is a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of such
item by the taxpayer."
Consider the advantages associated with this proposal. First,
the disclosure standard addresses concern over the misleading ef-
fects of nondisclosure by requiring taxpayers to disclose informa-
tion relating to all return positions in which the government may
have an interest. Admittedly, the IRS will not pursue some po-
224. See supra note 217. Admittedly, use of the recognized authority standard
prevents the government from advancing a legal theory in the absence of authority-
a privilege enjoyed by taxpayers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (as amended in
1995) ("[A] taxpayer may have substantial authority for a position that is supported
only by a well-reasoned construction of the applicable statutory provision."). How-
ever, the government has the unique ability to "create" authority by issuing a reve-
nue ruling or other agency release and therefore has the power to trigger taxpayer
disclosure with respect to issues the agency considers worthy of debate.
225. For a discussion of adequate disclosure, see supra note 213.
226. The underlined text indicates additions to the statute; crossed-out text indi-
cates deletions to the statute.
227. Cf. Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 92-93 ("If the client wishes
to file a return, not as a report and self-assessment document, but as the 'first step in
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sitions for which there is both supporting and contrary authority.
In the interest of minimizing the administrative burden imposed,
this proposal should expressly exchide these positions from the
disclosure requirement. The remaining return positions-
including those strongly favoring either the government or the
taxpayer-will appear on tax returns with the supplemental infor-
mation needed to ensure that the government has the opportunity
to consider and debate the merits of the taxpayer's position.
a process that may result in an adversarial relationship between the client and the
I.R.S.' fair notice should be given that the position is 'aggressive."' (emphasis
added)).
228. Although this proposal appears to impose a greater burden on taxpayers, in
fact they will find it easier to comply because it eliminates judgments on the persua-
siveness of authority from the evaluation process. See supra notes 216-20 and ac-
companying text. However, enhanced taxpayer disclosure further complicates the
review process now engaged in by the IRS. See LeDuc, Legislative Response, supra
note 213, at 386 (concern over the agency's ability to review disclosure documents
submitted by taxpayers may have prompted Congress to limit disclosure by endors-
ing the "substantial authority" standard when the penalty provision was added to the
Internal Revenue Code in 1982). The administrative burden imposed by this pro-
posal on the government can and should be addressed through the periodic publica-
tion of a list of positions for which no supplemental disclosure is required. For ex-
ample, if the IRS takes a position in a revenue ruling that is consistent with the
position reported by the taxpayer, the existence of other contrary authority on the
issue should not trigger supplemental disclosure. Certainly, the new standard could
be designed to trigger disclosure whenever a return position deviates from a written
policy established by the IRS; indeed, this approach was originally embraced by the
IRS but was rejected by Congress in favor of the "substantial authority" standard.
See id.; IRS STUDY, supra note 181 ("The Task Force believes that disclosure of the
issue should be required in either of two circumstances: (1) the taxpayer's position
lacks substantial authority; or (2) the issue has been specifically identified by IRS as
one that IRS wishes to address."). But this alternative imposes on the government
the task of anticipating and addressing the new theories developed by creative tax
planners and advanced by taxpayers on returns without disclosure. For this reason,
the government should define the scope of the disclosure requirement based on its
interest in specific issues and its ability to review supplemental disclosure. To the
extent that issues raised by return positions do not require review by the IRS, pub-
lished guidance made available to taxpayers and their advisors should limit disclo-
sure. The idea of the periodic publication of a list is consistent with the I.R.C. §
6662(d)(2)(D) requirement that the IRS publish a list of positions for which the IRS
believes there is no substantial authority. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(D) (1994); see also,
Rev. Proc. 95-55, 1995-52 I.R.B. 34 (addressing "substantial authority" under I.R.C.
§ 6662 as required by I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(D)); H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1390
(1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860.
[T]he bill requires the IRS to publish not less frequently than annually a listof positions for which the IRS believes there is no substantial authority and
which affect a significant number of taxpayers. The purpose of this list is to
assist taxpayers in determining whether a position should be disclosed in
order to avoid the substantial understatement penalty.
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In addition, under this proposal the process of evaluating the
need for disclosure is far less cumbersome and subjective than un-
der the existing approach. Rather than identify all relevant
authorities, weigh each for relative importance and persuasiveness
and conclude on the existence of substantial authority, the tax-
payer and tax advisor need only identify the existence of any rec-
ognized authority in conflict with the proposed return position. 29
Indeed, the proposal shifts responsibility for considering the rela-
tive strength of return positions from taxpayers to the government
and in so doing simplifies the return preparation process for tax-
payers while exploiting the expertise and resources of the govern-
ment. Questions will remain regarding the applicability of author-
ity to unusual or untested return positions, but taxpayers will
always be in the position to resolve the uncertainty surrounding
these positions in their favor provided that information related to
those positions is adequately disclosed on the return.
Of course, critics will argue that any effort to enhance disclo-
sure by taxpayers is inconsistent with the policy of minimizing the
intrusiveness of the tax compliance system. Certainly, lawmakers
and the IRS should consider the privacy rights of taxpayers and
the invasive nature of the taxpayer reporting system when shaping
policies relating to the collection of information from taxpayers.
"
3
However, with concern over taxpayer privacy largely addressed by
other legislation,2' the remaining objections raised over the inva-
siveness of the information-gathering process must yield to the le-
gitimate need of the government for information, a need most ob-
vious in the case of taxpayers who report questionable positions on
229. Cf. Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 103-04 (advocating a "single
relevant authority" standard that would rely on a narrowed definition of "authority"
to test the validity of return positions without resort to "weigh[ing].").
230. See generally Miller, Tax Compliance, supra note 85 (arguing that tax collect-
ing functions may, at times, undercut taxpayer privacy); LeDuc, Legislative Re-
sponse, supra note 228 (noting that Congress may have doubted the IRS's ability to
review taxpayer disclosure statements when endorsing the "substantial authority"
standard).
231. See generally Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (providing safeguards
against invasions of personal privacy by federal agencies); Bittker, Federal Income
Tax, supra note 80 (noting the existing rule which addresses taxpayer privacy); Ar-
chie W. Parnell, Jr., The Right to Privacy and the Administration of the Federal Tax
Laws, 31 TAX LAW. 113 (1977) (discussing the evolution of the right to privacy and
the Tax Reform Act of 1976); David E. Joyce, Note, Raiding the Confessional-The
Use of Income Tax Returns in Nontax Criminal Investigations, 48 FORDHAM L. REV.
1251 (1980) (noting the dilemma a criminal defendant faces when tax reports are
used as adverse evidence).
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returns. 2  Indeed, the fact that information provided on tax re-
turns in response to a heightened disclosure standard is the same
information taxpayers ultimately volunteer during examination of
the return to support return positions questioned by the examining
agent considerably weakens these objections.233 Thus, this pro-
posal asks taxpayers to give up only the ability to play the audit
lottery by hiding questionable positions from the government in an
effort to avoid examination and debate.
Another potential concern is the advantage supplemental dis-
closure provides to the government, an already formidable oppo-
nent. A heightened disclosure standard could provide the gov-
ernment with the information needed to make a case against the
taxpayer, thereby strengthening the government's position in the
audit, administrative appeals, and litigation forums. Overzealous
pursuit of unpaid taxes, often at the expense of taxpayer rights, has
left the agency with a reputation that justifies the caution practiced
by taxpayers and their representatives as well as the protective
measures endorsed recently by Congress.2 Nevertheless, the tax-
payer reporting and return examination process remains, at least in
theory, devoted to the collection of information needed to evalu-
ate taxpayer compliance. The fact that some examining agents
tarnish the reputation of the IRS and its compliance testing proc-
ess by abusing the discretion vested in them explains why many
will oppose this proposal.3 5 But if these valid concerns over abuse
of power within the IRS are addressed separately, the compliance
testing system-and its dependence on taxpayer disclosure--can
be acknowledged as an essential component of the revenue raising
system deserving of the advantages provided by this proposal.
Finally, the effectiveness of a standard that imposes on tax-
232. See United States v. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. 632 (1958).
233. See Bittker, Federal Income Tax, supra note 80, at 490. Of course, this repre-
sents only a theoretical argument in favor of return disclosure. Suggesting that in all
cases what is included on the return will inevitably be disclosed by the taxpayer dur-
ing an audit presumes that the return will be selected for audit and that the auditor
will request information on the transaction in question. Neither assumption is valid
in practice.
234. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 6227, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 3731 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7801)
(containing the Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights).
235. See generally James T. Towe, Is the IRS Above the Law? Potential Remedies
for Taxpayers Damaged by Unlawful IRS Conduct, 55 MONT. L. REV. 469 (1994)
(detailing the range of statutory remedies available to vindicate violations of tax-
payer privacy).
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payers an obligation to volunteer information to an adversary must
be considered. Penalties assessed in recent years suggest that tax-
payers remain willing to withhold information on return positions;
extremely low audit rates, together with the relatively small pen-
alty imposed by the substantial understatement penalty, provide
little incentive to comply2 6 Certainly, changes in the economic
risk associated with the refusal to disclose will affect taxpayer be-
havior.237 For this reason, both the amount of the penalty and its
relationship to other civil penalty provisions in the Internal Reve-
nue Code should be revisited2 8 However, the first step must be to
236. But see Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 330 ("While em-
pirical data on the point is not available, numerous experienced practitioners con-
firm that the substantial understatement penalty provided a much needed element of
discipline by giving taxpayers an economic reason to evaluate the quality of their tax
return positions.").
237. The substantial understatement penalty began as an addition to tax equal to
10% of the underpayment attributable to the return position. See I.R.C. § 6661(a)
(1985). The penalty was increased to 20% by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
1986). See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 94-514, §1504, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(100 Stat.) 2085, 2743. An increase to 25% was included in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA). See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
The substantial understatement penalty was incorporated into the section 6662 accu-
racy-related penalty provision in 1989, resulting in one 20% penalty. See I.R.C. §
6662(a) (1994). The debate over the "proper" amount of the penalty continues. See
Alfred Blumstein, Models for Structuring Taxpayer Compliance, in INCOME TAX
COMPLIANCE, REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION OF TAXATION INVITATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 161 (1983) (concluding that increasing
the risk of detection, increasing penalties, increasing taxpayers' perceived risk of de-
tection, or changing the tax structure may enhance taxpayer compliance). Given the
relationship between the probability of detection and tax return disclosure, Blum-
stein suggests that a penalty designed to encourage disclosure must vary in amount
with the probability of detection; in formula form, the penalty would be equal to the
underpayment divided by the probability of detection. Id. at 164-66. Thus, very high
penalties would accompany a low risk of detection.
238. In addition to a change in the amount of the substantial understatement
penalty, two other modifications in this penalty scheme should be considered. First,
the substantial understatement penalty should be removed from the accuracy-related
penalty provision so that the economic incentive provided by the penalty as means of
encouraging disclosure is not diminished by factors unrelated to disclosure. To ef-
fectively encourage disclosure in all circumstances, the substantial understatement
penalty must always present a threat to taxpayers considering nondisclosure. Con-
sider the taxpayer who intends to take a return position that is inconsistent with a
ruling issued by the IRS. Because taking such a position constitutes the disregard of
internal revenue rules and regulations, it subjects the taxpayer to the accuracy-
related penalty relating to negligence or disregard of the rules and regulations. See
I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1). The accuracy-related penalty is imposed with respect to under-
payments attributable to one or more of the five circumstances described in section
6662(b). Thus, only one 20% penalty is imposed irrespective of the number of
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change the nature of the disclosure obligation imposed by the sub-
stantial understatement penalty.
Since its inception in 1982, the substantial understatement
penalty has been considered by most experts as a provision impos-
ing on taxpayers a fee for the privilege of withholding information
from the government.23 Unlike other civil penalties to which tax-
"violations." See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c) (as amended in 1995) (underpayment at-
tributable to both negligence and substantial understatement of income tax is subject
to only one accuracy-related penalty); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(b)(6), example 2 (as
amended in 1995) (illustrating the effect of the 1989 consolidation of penalties by
applying pre-1989 law to a fact pattern justifying imposition of separate penalties for
negligence and substantial understatement of income tax). Consequently, a taxpayer
in this situation is left with no independent incentive to disclose. For this reason, the
substantial understatement penalty must be a penalty imposed in addition to other
penalties so that an independent incentive to disclose is provided in all situations.
Cf. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF TAX
PENALTIES 27-28 (Joint Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT].
Some have argued that it is inappropriate to impose the negligence or fraud
penalty and an understatement penalty with respect to the same underpay-
ment of tax because the understatement penalties were designed to apply
without proving fault on the part of the taxpayer (which is a necessary ele-
ment in proving negligence or fraud). On the other hand, it may be appro-
priate to permit the imposition of both penalties with respect to the same
underpayment in appropriate circumstances, because the understatement
penalties and the negligence and fraud penalties are targeted at different
aspects of the taxpayer's behavior.
Id.
Second, the "reasonable cause and good faith" exception to the accuracy-
related penalty provision should be limited to penalties other than the substantial
understatement penalty. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(a) (as
amended in 1995). Elimination of this exception would return the penalty to its pre-
1989 status as a "no-fault" penalty. See I.R.C. § 6661(c) (making a reasonable cause
and good faith exception available at the option of the Commissioner); Treas. Reg. §
1.6661-6(a) (1985) (making a reasonable cause and good faith exception available at
the option of the Commissioner). Because disclosure is the objective furthered by
imposition of the penalty, and because taxpayers always have the option of disclos-
ing, a taxpayer's reasons for failing to disclose, however reasonable they may be, are
not germane to the penalty and therefore should not be considered. See Holden,
Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 330, 342 (advocating a return to a "no-
fault" substantial understatement penalty). However, elimination of the "reasonable
cause and good faith" exception will reintroduce concern over the ability of a tax-
payer to rely on the advice of the tax advisor regarding the need for disclosure. See
H.R. REP. No. 101-247, at 1392-94 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2862-64
(detailing the reasons for adoption of an exception to the accuracy-related penalty).
Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4)(i)(B) (as amended in 1995) (noting that rea-
sonable reliance in good faith on the opinion of a professional tax advisor triggers
the exception) with id. § 1.6661-5(b) (1985) (noting that reliance on the advice of a
tax professional does not necessarily justify government's use of the exception).
239. See Durst, supra note 87, at 1065-69 (examining the history of the legislation
creating the substantial understatement penalty, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), and concluding that the penalty was intended to pro-
vide a financial disincentive to taxpayers interested in playing the audit lottery);
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payers may be subject, the original "no fault" character of this
penalty provided taxpayers with an economic incentive to disclose
without raising the minimal "reasonableness" standard of behavior
imposed on taxpayers by the negligence penalty.24 With the
Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 330 (observing that the substantial
understatement penalty provides taxpayers with an economic incentive to disclose);
Report on Civil Tax Penalties, Executive Task Force, Commissioner's Penalty Study,
Internal Revenue Service pt. VII at 10 (1989), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at
S-2 (Special Supp. Feb. 23, 1989) (describing the substantial understatement penalty
as a "toll charge"). The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation summarized the
theory underlying use of a penalty provision to provide taxpayers with an economic
incentive to comply in a 1988 report on tax penalties:
The costs of compliance, from the taxpayer's standpoint, consist of the
value of the taxes and other expenses paid as well as the effort required for
timely and accurate compliance with the laws. The benefits to the taxpayer
from compliance stem from negative consequences avoided. The negative
consequences of noncompliance arise from the possibility that the taxpayer
will be audited and identified as a noncomplier, the original tax liability
plus interest and penalties will have to be paid, and criminal charges may be
brought.
The expected benefit to the taxpayer of noncompliance equals the value
of failing to pay tax without detection, minus the chance of being caught
times the perceived costs, if caught. An increase in the probability of de-
tecting noncompliance or an increase in the level of the potential penalty
imposed generally will raise the incentive for compliance. The deterrent ef-
fect of penalties is therefore integrally related to both the likelihood of de-
tection and the severity of the penalties.
JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 238, at 17.
Characterization of the penalty as an "incentive" or "toll charge" suggests
that the substantial understatement penalty encourages, but does not mandate, dis-
closure. In fact, a number of commentators conclude that Congress did not intend to
establish an affirmative obligation to disclose when it created the substantial under-
statement penalty in 1982. See Durst, supra note 87, at 1074 ("While there certainly
is some moral opprobrium involved in violating the section 6661 standard, there are
also indications that, in the view of Congress and others involved directly in tax
compliance, the taxpayer retains the ultimate decision whether to violate the stan-
dard in return for bearing the risk that the penalty will be imposed."); Holden,
Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 331 (stating that "[t]he 1982 enactment of
the substantial understatement penalty.., did not create a normative taxpayer stan-
dard of conduct, requiring either substantial authority or disclosure on the return").
But see Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions, supra note 111, at 975 ("In enacting
the substantial understatement penalty, Congress made the decision that a taxpayer
who takes an undisclosed return position that is not supported by substantial
authority fails to satisfy his basic obligation to the tax system.").
240. See Durst, supra note 87, at 1069.
If Congress had intended "substantial authority" to be a normatively
binding standard, it could have established "substantial authority" as a
standard for all tax understatements, with the provision that the amount of
liability be considered in determining whether the authority relied on by
the taxpayer was "substantial." Alternatively, the statute could have pro-
vided for a graduated penalty based on the amount of liability involved.
These or similar options would have enabled Congress, much less ambigu-
ously, to establish "substantial authority" as a binding normative standard.
The current statutory structure, in contrast, supports the view that the
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elimination of the "no fault" feature in 1989, the case for a norma-
tive standard became stronger.24 More importantly, however, the
disclosure standard established through the use of the substantial
understatement penalty must be characterized as a normative ob-
ligation in order to characterize properly the failure to comply
through disclosure as an affirmative wrong against the system,
rather than as a harmless election to which the taxpayer is enti-
tled.242 This new normative obligation will prompt many taxpayers
to respond with disclosure in the interest of filing a correct re-
turn.24 Those remaining-the taxpayers who are prepared to dis-
regard reporting obligations in the interest of maximizing the
chances of prevailing on questionable issues-must be encouraged
by the threat of penalty.
But even these measures will not change the attitudes of those
taxpayers who withhold information as a means of avoiding an in-
ternal revenue audit. Given the obvious connection between sup-
plemental disclosure and the probability of audit-one commenta-
tor describes the supplemental disclosure form used by the IRS as
the "Please Audit Me Now" form4-failure to address taxpayer
concerns over the fairness of the return examination process will
impede efforts to encourage supplemental disclosure by taxpayers.
Recent efforts made by Congress and the IRS to curtail overzeal-
ous conduct by government representatives during the audit proc-
ess are a promising start to what will necessarily be a long-term ef-
fort to reform the audit process and change taxpayer attitudes
"reasonable basis" standard of section 6653(a) [recodified as I.R.C. §
6662(b)(1)] remains the normative standard for all taxpayers, with section
6661[recodified as § 6662(b)(2)] providing an additional financial disincen-
tive for wealthier taxpayers.
Id.; see also Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 332 (concurring that a
normative standard is established by the negligence penalty rather than the substan-
tial understatement penalty).
241. For a discussion of the substantial understatement penalty as a "no fault"
provision, see supra note 238. Cf Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at
330 ("[A]nother consequence of the no-fault character of the section 6661 penalty
... was the fact that it did not establish a normative standard of taxpayer conduct.").
242. See IRS STUDY, supra note 181 ("Making appropriate disclosures is an inte-
gral part of preparing a proper return and should not be optional even if the tax-
payer would prefer to run the risk of a penalty rather than make the disclosure.");
Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions, supra note 111, at 975.
243. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 62, at 355 (discussing the impact
of normative standards on taxpayer compliance).
244. See Philipps et al., It's Not Easy, supra note 109, at 603 (referring to form
8275); see also Corneel, supra note 108, at 9 (explaining that the use of riders submit-
ted with returns gives the government a "sporting chance" at detecting noncompli-
ance).
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toward return examination as an essential element of the taxpayer
compliance testing process.245
B. The Lawyer's Duty to the Taxpayer and the Taxing System
The lawyer's duty as taxpayer representative is to advise cli-
ents on how to comply with the internal revenue laws.246 This duty
manifests itself in the return preparation and examination context
as an obligation to advise taxpayers with respect to both the valid-
ity of return positions and the need for disclosure. Tax lawyers
also are subject to general ethical duties-duties that often require
the lawyer to take affirmative action in response to client miscon-
duct. These duties must be examined and reevaluated in light of
the higher standard for disclosure imposed on taxpayers by the
proposal advanced above.
1. Advising on return positions
Taxpayers are entitled to seek any lawful objective defined by
the internal revenue laws.247 The lawyer serving as taxpayer advi-
sor and representative is ethically obligated to advise and assist
clients in seeking those lawful objectives. 24s When the law is un-
245. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§ 6227, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 3731 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7801) (containing
the Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-
168, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1452; see also Sheryl Stratton, President Signs
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, 72 TAX NOTES 667 (1996) (stating that the 1996 version of
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights will impose new penalties on IRS employees engaged in
misconduct).
246. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-1 (stating that the legal profession "has
the duty of assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal
rights and benefits"). A number of commentators take the position that the lawyer's
duties as tax advisor must be defined by taxpayer duties and therefore are necessar-
ily limited to advice on what the law requires. See Durst, supra note 87, at 1048;
Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 89; Holden, Practitioner's Standard, su-
pra note 79, at 330.
247. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-1 ("[E]ach member of our society is
entitled to have his conduct judged and regulated in accordance with the law; to seek
any lawful objective through legally permissible means; and to present for adjudica-
tion any lawful claim, issue, or defense.").
248. Paul, Lawyer, supra note 95, at 418 ("[I]t is ... [the tax lawyer's] positive
duty to show the client how to avail himself to the full of what the law permits."
(citing MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-1)); see also Durst, supra note 87, at 1048
(concluding that the lawyer's duties as tax advisor must be defined by taxpayer du-
ties and therefore are necessarily limited to advice on what the law requires); Han-
delman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 89-90 (concluding that the lawyer's duties as
tax advisor must be defined by taxpayer duties and therefore are necessarily limited
to advice on what the law requires); Kenneth L. Harris, On Requiring the Correction
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clear, the tax lawyer may resolve doubt in favor of the taxpayer.
2
A
9
But unlike lawyers engaged in other areas of practice,20 tax law-
yers may not take client loyalty to its logical extreme by recom-
mending any nonfrivolous position. Rather, lawyers representing
taxpayers may recommend only those positions satisfying the
higher "realistic possibility of success" standard adopted by the
ABA Ethics Committee in Formal Opinion 85-352. Although
well-intentioned-the higher reporting standard was designed to
discourage taxpayers from taking the most aggressive of return
positions-the "realistic possibility of success" standard actually
prevents lawyers from assisting taxpayers in advancing the most
aggressive of nonfrivolous return positions. 2
The Internal Revenue Code's substantial understatement
of Error Under the Federal Tax Law, 42 TAX LAW. 515, 522 (1988) [hereinafter Har-
ris, Requiring the Correction] (discussing how the ethical duty of competence re-
quires the lawyer to advise clients on what the law requires); Holden, Practitioner's
Standard, supra note 79, at 330 (concluding that the lawyer's duties as tax advisor
must be defined by taxpayer duties and therefore are necessarily limited to advice on
what the law requires).
249. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-3 ("While serving as advocate, a law-
yer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law."); Corn-
eel, supra note 108, at 305.
250. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-4.
[The lawyer's] conduct is within the bounds of the law, and therefore per-
missible, if the position taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law.
However, a lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that is
frivolous.
Id.; see also MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.2(d) ("[A lawyer] may counsel or
assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
application of the law.").
The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have the action
taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a per-
son or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on the
merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith ar-
gument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
Id., Rule 3.1 cmt. 2.
251. Although Formal Opinion 85-352 fails to define "realistic possibility of suc-
cess" quantitatively, the Task Force Report issued concurrently with the opinion
suggests that the Committee intended for this standard to be higher than
"nonfrivolous." See infra note 257; cf. Michael B. Lang, Commentary on Return Pre-
parer Obligations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 128, 142 (1996) (noting that authors of a leading
treatise conclude that lawyers should be permitted to recommend all disclosed non-
frivolous return positions) (citing BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX
PRACTICE 204.2.4.2, at 80-81 (3d ed. 1995)).
252. Indeed, the profession's decision to address the problem of aggressive return
positions in this manner actually protects a taxpayer's opportunity to report without
disclosure; instead of mandating disclosure in appropriate situations, this approach
sacrifices the taxpayer's right to advance the most questionable of return positions in
the interest of protecting the remainder from supplemental disclosure.
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penalty provision imposes a similar reporting threshold on taxpay-
ers directly. While taxpayers may avoid the substantial under-
statement penalty by adequately disclosing a questionable return
position, this disclosure safe harbor is effective only if the position
also satisfies the new "reasonable basis" standard.2 3 Although
"reasonable basis" remains undefined,2" the treasury regulations
describe the standard as higher than nonfrivolous." Thus, the
substantial understatement penalty holds taxpayers to a higher re-
porting standard by penalizing taxpayers for taking positions not
satisfying the "reasonable basis" standard, notwithstanding ade-
quate disclosure of those positions. 5'
Admittedly, these restrictions do not prevent taxpayers from
advancing nonfrivolous return positions. Taxpayers remain free to
raise any nonfrivolous position in the context of a refund suit,21 a
253. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
254. Treasury's failure to define "reasonable basis" is evidenced by those sections
of the treasury regulations reserved for the definition. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
3(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 1995); id. § 1.6662-7(d)(1) (1995).
255. See id § 1.6662-3(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1995) (describing "reasonable ba-
sis" as "significantly higher than the not frivolous.").
256. This standard effectively raises the reporting standard for taxpayers-for ex-
ample, the standard that addresses the legitimacy of a return position-by eliminat-
ing the disclosure safe harbor in the case of return positions not satisfying the
"reasonable basis" standard. See id. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1995) (dis-
closure exception relating to penalty for disregard of the rules and regulations avail-
able only if taxpayer has a "reasonable basis" for the position); H.R. REP. No. 103-
111, at 754 (1993), reprinted in 1993-3 C.B. 167, 330 ("The committee believes that
the 'frivolous' standard does not sufficiently discourage taxpayers and preparers
from taking unreasonable return positions. Accordingly, to encourage compliance,
the committee believes that a tougher standard should be imposed."); see also J.
Timothy Philipps et al., What Part of RPOS Don't You Understand? An Update and
Survey of Standards for Tax Return Positions, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1163, 1180
(1994) [hereinafter Philipps et al., RPOS] (describing the new "reasonable basis"
standard as a higher reporting standard); Richard C. Stark, Let's Reconsider the
'Reasonable Basis' Standard, 59 TAx NoTEs 1845, 1845 (1993) (referring to the
"reasonable basis" standard as a "minimum standard").
257. A taxpayer may advance a legal theory in the tax setting in one of two ways:
(1) the taxpayer can take a position on the return based on that legal theory and pur-
sue the issue in litigation commenced in the U.S. Tax Court following rejection of the
theory by the government, see I.R.C. § 6213(a); or (2) the taxpayer can omit the po-
sition from the return, pay the tax on the resulting liability and raise the legal theory
in a refund action brought in a U.S. district court or the U.S. Federal Court of
Claims, see id. § 7402(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1996). The Task Force Report issued
concurrently with Formal Opinion 85-352 contemplated that the most aggressive of
return positions-those failing to meet the "realistic possibility of success" stan-
dard-should be advanced by taxpayers in refund suits:
If the [realistic possibility of success] standard is not met, the position may
be advanced by payment of the tax and claim for refund, which necessarily
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process that ensures that the most questionable of positions will
receive the government's full attention. However, exclusive use of
this refund suit approach limits a taxpayer's ability to litigate issues
in the Tax Court and thereby denies some taxpayers-those un-
able to pay the tax associated with the disputed position-their
day in court.59
The importance of equal access to the Tax Court alone is suf-
ficient reason to eliminate this restriction on reported positions.2'
The case for reform becomes even more compelling by acknowl-
edging that use of the "reasonable basis" standard in the substan-
tial understatement penalty disclosure safe harbor actually dis-
courages disclosure in those cases in which supplemental
disclosure is needed most. These compromises need not be made.
Instead, the validity of return positions and the need for supple-
mental disclosure of those positions should be evaluated sepa-
rately. Taxpayers should be permitted to advance any nonfrivo-
lous position on a tax return,26 and counsel should be free to assist
sets forth in detail each ground upon which a refund is claimed. A position
may be advanced in litigation if it is not frivolous. The lawyer may bring a
proceeding, and assert an issue therein, if there is a basis for doing so that is
not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modi-
fication or reversal of existing law. In such a context good faith does not
require that there be a possibility of success that is "realistic."
Task Force Report, supra note 112, at 639 (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 7-
102(A)(2); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 3.1).
258. The Internal Revenue Code contemplates that taxpayers will litigate non-
frivolous positions in the Tax Court. See I.R.C. § 6673(a)(1)(B) (creating a pre-
sumption in favor of the right to litigate nonfrivolous positions by authorizing the
imposition of sanctions for litigating a "frivolous or groundless" position).
259. This troubling result has prompted criticism from a number of commentators.
See Gwen T. Handelman, Caring Reasonably, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 345 (1991)
[hereinafter Handelman, Caring]; Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions, supra
note 111, at 975; Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 342; Philipps et
al., RPOS, supra note 256, at 1184; Stark, supra note 256, at 1846.
260. See Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 98 ("[Ihe client's right to
litigate liability before payment may necessitate adopting a debatable position in re-
porting tax liability on the return .... ."); Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note
79, at 334 ("If a taxpayer is entitled to test... [any non-frivolous] position before the
Tax Court without having to pay the associated tax liability, the taxpayer presumably
has the right to report such a position on the tax return."); Philipps et al., RPOS, su-
pra note 256, at 1184 ("The taxpayer is entitled to a prepayment forum in which to
assert his position. This is the raison d'etre of the Tax Court and is a fundamental
feature of the federal tax enforcement process.") (citations omitted).
261. This change in the taxpayer reporting standard can be accomplished by
eliminating the reasonable basis standard found in the accuracy-related penalty pro-
vision of the Code. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (using the "reasonable basis"
standard in substantial understatement penalty); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as
amended in 1995) (using the "reasonable basis" standard in penalty for disregard of
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clients in pursuing these return positions.262 This liberal reporting
standard protects every taxpayer's right to litigate in all judicial fo-
rums and encourages compliance with the higher taxpayer disclo-
sure standard by allowing maximum freedom to advance debat-
able return positions. Disclosure-a necessary compliment to a
relaxed reporting standard-is left to address the threat posed by
aggressive return positions without artificially limiting a taxpayer's
right to advance positions.
2. The duty to recommend disclosure
Lawyers have no affirmative duty to recommend disclosure of
return positions under current practice guidelines.263  Given the
confusion surrounding the nature of the current disclosure stan-
dard and the lawyer's natural aversion to voluntary disclosure,
failure of the ethics rules and the Rules of Practice to address the
duty to recommend disclosure is not surprising. But by character-
izing the disclosure standard established by the substantial under-
statement penalty as an affirmative disclosure obligation, the law-
yer becomes ethically obligated to recommend disclosure. The
the rules and regulations). This proposal enjoys the support of other commentators.
See James P. Holden, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice: A Commentary, 9 VA.
TAX REV. 771, 773 (1990) [hereinafter Holden, Constraining]; Philipps et al., RPOS,
supra note 256, at 1184.
262. The Rules of Practice and the I.R.C. § 6694 preparer penalty provision cur-
rently measure the conduct of lawyers serving as tax advisors based on this
"nonfrivolous" standard. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1)(ii) (1996)
("nonfrivolous" standard applied in defining duties of tax return advisor); Treas.
Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1992) ("nonfrivolous" standard applied to dis-
closed positions for purposes of preparer penalty); see also id. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as
amended in 1995) (utilizing "nonfrivolous" standard in the context of the disclosure
exception to substantial understatement penalty prior to amendment in 1993). Thus,
the only change required by this proposal involves replacement of the "realistic pos-
sibility of success" standard in Formal Opinion 85-352 with the "nonfrivolous" stan-
dard to be used exclusively for evaluating the validity of return positions. This
change conforms the duty of the tax lawyer to the basic ethical standard applied to
lawyers in other areas of practice. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952)
(stating that lawyers should not press even "farfetched and untenable" claims);
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 7-102(A)(2); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule
3.1; FREEDMAN, supra note 12, at 9 (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 31, DR 7-
102(A)(2)); cf MODEL RULEs, supra note 31, Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or
defend a proceeding ... unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous,
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.").
263. See Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 116, at 633; see also 31 C.F.R. §
10.34(a)(1)(ii) (limiting practitioner duties to advice on the possible imposition of
penalties and the opportunity to avoid penalties through disclosure); infra note 269
(questioning whether recommending disclosure of return positions is necessary).
TAXPAYER REPRESENTATION
profession's ethics rules and the Rules of Practice should acknowl-
edge the lawyer's duty to recommend disclosure in those situations
in which taxpayers are required to support return positions with
adequate disclosure.
Consistent with the approach taken in defining the taxpayer
standard of disclosure, the standard applied to lawyers involved in
the preparation of returns should be based on the concept of
"recognized authority"-if any recognized authority exists that
conflicts with the position reported on the return, the taxpayer
must adequately disclose the position in order to prevent mislead-
ing the government as to the nature of the position. 4 As modi-
fied, the provision in Circular 230 addressing the role of the lawyer
as tax return preparer and advisor would prohibit the lawyer from
signing any return that includes an undisclosed position for which
there is any recognized authority in conflict with the position and
would require the lawyer to recommend disclosure whenever the
nature of the position triggered the taxpayer duty to disclose:
§ 10.34 STANDARDS FOR ADVISING WITH RESPECT TO TAX
RETURN POSITIONS AND FOR PREPARING AND SIGNING RE-
TURNS.
(a) Standards of Conduct - Realist possibi..ty -cag,-
nized authority standard. A practitioner may not sign a
return as a preparer if the practitioner determines that the
return contains a position for which there exists any rec-
ognized authority contrary to the position tht-does-net
have a realistie possibility of being sustained an its mert
(the realistie pssibility standard) unless the position is
not frivolous and is adequately disclosed to the Service.
A practitioner may not advise a client to take a position
on a return, or prepare the portion of a return on which a
position is taken, unless -
(i) The practitioner determines that ed
authority exists which is contrary to the proposed re-
111MQi~~..h po0sitio n satisfies the fealisticpo
sibility-standatrd; or
(ii) The position is not frivolous and the practitioner
recommends adequate disclosure of the position and
advises the client of any opportunity to avoid the ac-
curacy-related penalty in section 6662 of the Internal
264. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
January 1997]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Revenue Code of 1986 by adequately disclosing the
position and of the requirements for adequate disclo-
sure.
265
Corresponding changes would be required in the § 6694 preparer
penalty provision:
(a) Understatement Due to Unrealiati UndisclosedPo-
sitions - If -
(1) any part of any understatement of liability with
respect to any return or claim for refund is due to a
position for which there was any recognized authority
contrary to the position not a rl,,, osibi,. ty ,, i,
being sustained en its moerits,
(2) any person who is an income tax return preparer
with respect to such return or claim knew (or rea-
sonably should have known) of such position, and
(3) such position was not disclosed as provided in
section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) or was frivolous,
such person shall pay a penalty of $250 with respect to
such return or claim unless it is shown that there is rea-
sonable cause for the understatement and such person
acted in good faith.
This effort to redefine the duties of the tax lawyer also should in-
clude modifications in the rules of ethics as interpreted by Formal
Opinion 85-352. Realistically, however, it will be the Rules of
Practice and the Internal Revenue Code's penalty provisions,
rather than the ethics rules, which compel tax lawyers to recom-
mend disclosure.266
265. Changes in Circular 230 also would include replacement of the provision de-
fining "realistic possibility" with a similar provision defining "recognized authority."
266. The Rules of Practice apply to all tax practitioners and carry with them the
threat of suspension or disbarment. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.34(b), 10.52 (subjecting
practitioners to discipline only for violations arising out of conduct which is willful,
reckless, or the result of gross incompetence); see also id. §§ 10.50, 10.51(g) (defining
the power to disbar practitioners and defining "disreputable conduct"). In contrast,
the legal profession's rules of ethics are enforceable by state action only to the extent
that the rules are adopted by each state. To date, no state has taken action to adopt
the guidelines established in either Formal Opinion 314 or Formal Opinion 85-352.
See Holden, Practitioner's Standard, supra note 79, at 340. The profession's rules of
ethics provide guidance and encourage the pursuit of ethical goals but are otherwise
of limited value in encouraging desired conduct from tax lawyers. Focus on the
Rules of Practice in lieu of the rules of ethics is also appropriate given the impor-
tance of imposing a uniform set of standards on all tax practitioners in an effort to
avoid singling out lawyers and thereby encouraging taxpayers to seek advice from
(Vol. 30:693
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Equally important is the duty to recommend disclosure during
examination of the return. Formal Opinion 314 suggests that law-
yers should recommend correction of statements that mislead the
IRS267 while the Rules of Practice state only that errors discovered
by the lawyer should be called to the attention of the taxpayer.2 '
Undoubtedly, confusion over the lawyer's duties in this situation
stems from the more fundamental issue of error correction and the
taxpayer's duty to file an amended return.269 In fact, some com-
mentators suggest that error correction is exclusively a function of
tax liability, thereby minimizing the importance of information re-
porting.270 But the nature and importance of the taxpayer disclo-
other professionals.
267. See Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672 ("The difficult problem arises
where the client has in fact misled but without the lawyer's knowledge or participa-
tion. In that situation, upon discovery of the misrepresentation, the lawyer must ad-
vise the client to correct the statement .....
268. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.21.
Each attorney.., who.., knows that the client has not complied with the
revenue laws of the United States or has made an error in or omission from
any return, document, affidavit, or other paper which the client is required
by the revenue laws of the United States to execute, shall advise the client
promptly of the fact of such noncompliance, error, or omission.
Id.; see Corneel, supra note 108, at 306.
With respect to client conduct that may lead to certain ... civil penalties-
such as a penalty under section 6662-the professional's obligation is
merely to warn the client. Nevertheless, it would be highly unusual for this
firm to participate in conduct certain to lead to civil tax penalties; indeed
we will generally not participate when a civil penalty to the taxpayer would
more likely than not result if the return were audited and all of the facts
were presented to a court.
Id
269. See generally Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386,393 (1984) ("Internal
Revenue Code does not explicitly provide either for a taxpayer's filing, or for the
Commissioner's acceptance, of an amended return."); Corneel, supra note 108, at
303 n.18 (questioning whether the failure to disclose information on a return can
constitute an "error" given the confusion over the duty to file an amended return);
Harris, Requiring the Correction, supra note 248 (exploring the question whether a
taxpayer has an affirmative duty to file an amended return).
270. This raises the question: What is an "incorrect" return. Is it incorrect when a
taxpayer fails to disclose as required by the proposed standard or only when the re-
turn position in question proves to be "incorrect"? If measured by the need for an
amended return, the nature of the problem caused by the taxpayer's conduct may
provide the answer. For example, Lang suggests that the taxpayer should consider
filing an amended return when the error "has a significant effect on the taxpayer's
tax liability" but also includes in the lawyer's duties an obligation to advise that the
law does not require the filing of an amended return. See Lang, supra note 251, at
143-44; see also Bittker, Professional Responsibility, supra note 72 (stating that if the
purpose of a tax return is simply to support the taxpayer's conclusion regarding tax
liability, the return is correct as long as liability is correct). Clearly, this approach
minimizes the importance of information reporting and its value to the IRS both in
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sure standard make a taxpayer's failure to disclose as troubling as
a misstatement of tax liability. For this reason, these rules should
treat the failure to disclose as an error requiring correction and
should require the lawyer to recommend correction through dis-
closure, either pursuant to an amended return or during audit of
the return.m .
3. When the taxpayer refuses to disclose
How should the lawyer respond to a taxpayer's refusal to
comply with the proposed disclosure standard? Voluntary with-
drawal is an option available to lawyers in most cases,23 but a true
advocate does not withdraw from an engagement out of concern
over a taxpayer's refusal to assist an opponent by voluntarily dis-
closing information. Indeed, Formal Opinion 85-352 confirms that
the lawyer has no ethical obligation to respond to a taxpayer's re-
selected returns for audit and in selecting transactions to test during audit. If infor-
mation reporting is considered essential to the success of the compliance testing sys-
tem, the failure to include information on a return in satisfaction of the taxpayer
disclosure standard should be treated as a failure to file a correct return.
271. See Darrell, supra note 93, at 27 (explaining that the lawyer has an affirma-
tive obligation to recommend the filing of an amended return); see also AMERICAN
INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. Accr., STATEMENT ON RESPONSIBILITIES IN TAX PRACTICE
No. 7 § .04 (1988); Lang, supra note 251, at 143-44 ("The preparer should advise the
taxpayer that the law does not require the filing of an amended return to correct the
error, but that if the error has a significant effect on the taxpayer's tax liability, the
taxpayer should consider filing an amended return to correct the error." (citations
omitted)).
Does changing this to a normative duty make the failure to disclose tanta-
mount to filing an incorrect return, thereby violating the civil and criminal provisions
relating to the duty to file a correct return? In the context of the section 7206 jurat
regarding "true and correct" returns, Phillips suggests that as long as the taxpayer
believes the requirement has been met, there is no violation. Philipps et al., RPOS,
supra note 256, at 1184 n.91.
272. There is a clear distinction between failure to disclose on the return and si-
lence during the audit, and the refusal to respond to a question from the agent dur-
ing the audit. The latter is clearly wrong; the former is the subject of this Article.
See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
273. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-110(C) (addressing permissive with-
drawal); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.16(b) (addressing permissive with-
drawal). Withdrawal is not permitted, however, when it will have a prejudicial effect
on the client. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-110(A)(2); MODEL RULES, sU-
pra note 31, Rule 1.16(b); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-8 ("In the event
that the client in a non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a course of conduct that is
contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplinary
Rules, the lawyer may withdraw from the employment."); id. EC 7-9 ("[W]hen an
action in the best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his cli-
ent for permission to forego such action.").
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fusal to disclose information on questionable return positions.214
But by recharacterizing the taxpayer disclosure standard as a nor-
mative duty, current ethical guidelines become a license to disre-
gard a client's refusal to comply with the internal revenue laws.
Thus, the nature and importance of taxpayer disclosure demands
that lawyers be compelled to respond when a client refuses to dis-
close.
Is the lawyer obligated to disclose that which the taxpayers fail
to disclose? The concept of independent disclosure, particularly if
made against the a client's wishes, is inconsistent with both the
duty of loyalty to the client and the duty to protect client confi-
dences. Nevertheless, lawyers are ethically obligated to disclose
under some circumstances. The ethical duty of candor prohibits
lawyers from knowingly failing to disclose material facts to a tri-
bunal whenever disclosure is necessary to prevent a client from
committing a criminal or fraudulent act.2 5 A similar duty is im-
posed on lawyers with respect to third parties,26 but only the duty
owed to tribunals mandates disclosure even in the case of client
confidences. 277 Thus, the lawyer's ethical duty to volunteer to the
274. Formal Opinion 85-352 describes the lawyer's duty as follows:
In the role of advisor, the lawyer should counsel the client as to whether the
position is likely to be sustained by a court if challenged by the IRS, as well
as of the potential penalty consequences to the client if the position is taken
on the tax return without disclosure. Section 6661 of the Internal Revenue
Code imposes a penalty for substantial understatement of tax liability which
can be avoided if the facts are adequately dis.closed or if there is or was sub-
stantial authority for the position taken by the taxpayer. Competent repre-
sentation of the client would require the lawyer to advise the client fully as
to whether there is or was substantial authority for the position taken in the
tax return. If the lawyer is unable to conclude that the position is supported
by substantial authority, the lawyer should advise the client of the penalty
the client may suffer and of the opportunity to avoid such penalty by ade-
quately disclosing the facts in the return or in a statement attached to the
return. If after receiving such advice the client decides to risk the penalty by
making no disclosure and to take the position initially advised by the lawyer
in accordance with the standard stated above, the lawyer has met his or her
ethical responsibility with respect to the advice.
Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 111, at 633 (emphasis added); see also New York City
Bar Report, supra note 57, at 876 (stating that there is no duty to withdraw, absent
evidence of criminal or fraudulent conduct).
275. See MODEL RULEs, supra note 31, Rule 3.3(a)(2); cf. MODEL CODE, supra
note 5, DR 7-102(A)(3) ("[A lawyer shall not] [c]onceal or knowingly fail to disclose
that which he is required by law to reveal."); id EC 7-23 (describing and justifying
duty of candor toward tribunal).
276. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 4.1(b); see also id, Rule 3.4 (duty of
fairness to opposing party and counsel); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 7-
102(A)(3) (duty to reveal information when mandated by law).
277. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 3.3(b); cf. id Rule 4.1(b) (providing
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IRS information not disclosed by a client is a function of the role
played by the IRS: tribunal or opponent.278
Although the IRS functions as both tribunal and opponent
within the tax compliance process, it is uniformly treated as an op-
ponent for puroses of defining the duties of lawyers and other tax
practitioners.7  Indeed, the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which treat administrative agencies as tribunals when
conducting nonadjudicative proceedings, ° nevertheless treat
agencies as opponents when engaged in negotiations and other bi-
lateral transactions.2' The agency's role as decision-maker should
not be ignored. Nevertheless, differences between the IRS and a
traditional tribunal, together with the "bilateral" nature of the
compliance process, offer a compelling case in favor of treating the
IRS as an opponent. Equally important are the practical conse-
quences associated with disclosure by counsel: the lawyer who
shares information with the IRS satisfies the taxpayer's legal obli-
gation to disclose rather than an ethical duty to assist a tribunal
that there is no duty to disclose client confidences protected by Rule 1.6). In the
case of disclosure made to third parties, the duty to protect client confidences may be
compromised only when necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal
act involving death or substantial bodily harm. See id. Rule 1.6(b)(1).
278. The remaining question is whether a taxpayer's failure to disclose constitutes
"criminal or fraudulent conduct" for purposes of defining the lawyer's duty of disclo-
sure to tribunals. Failure to disclose is not a crime. See Formal Op. 314, supra note
98, at 672.
Nor does the absolute duty not to make false assertions of fact require the
disclosure of weaknesses in the client's case and in no event does it require
the disclosure of his confidences, unless the facts in the attorney's posses-
sion indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed. A
wrong, or indeed sometimes an unjust, tax result in the settlement of a con-
troversy is not a crime.
Id.; see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.20(a) (acknowledging duty to disclose information to the
IRS, subject to ethical duty to protect client confidences).
279. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text; see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.20(a)
(discussing role of IRS as tribunal suggested by acknowledgment in rule of the law-
yer's duty to protect client confidences).
280. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 3.9.
In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils, and
executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-
making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance argu-
ment in the matters under consideration. The decision-making body, like a
court, should be able to rely on the integrity of the submissions made to it.
A lawyer appearing before such a body should deal with the tribunal hon-
estly and in conformity with applicable rules of procedure.
Id. Rule 3.9 cmt. 1.
281. See id. Rule 3.9 cmt. 3 ("[Rule 3.9] does not apply to representation of a cli-
ent in a negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental agency; repre-
sentation in such a transaction is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4 [addressing
transactions with others].").
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and, in the process, assists the opposition in contravention of the
duty of loyalty to the client.2 For these reasons, lawyers have no
ethical duty to disclose what a client refuses to disclose2
Logically, the other alternative available to lawyers con-
fronted with a client's refusal to disclose is withdrawal. But be-
cause withdrawal is almost always available to those lawyers who
find client conduct morally objectionable,u the issue is whether
lawyers should be required to terminate an engagement when a
taxpayer refuses to comply with the mandatory disclosure re-
quirement. Further, the question of mandatory withdrawal is of
practical consequence only in a limited set of circumstances. Law-
yers retained as return preparers are already subject to rules effec-
tively mandating withdrawal whenever a taxpayer refuses to com-
ply with the taxpayer disclosure standard. In addition, lawyers
'282. See id. Rule 4.1 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing
with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an
opposing party of relevant facts."); cf. Falk, supra note 52, at 650 (concluding that
the IRS falls somewhere between a true tribunal and a traditional opponent).
283. See Harris, Requiring the Correction, supra note 248, at 523 (tax lawyer has
no duty to disclose client error). Indeed, the lawyer is ethically obligated to remain
silent, given the duty to protect client confidences. See MODEL RULES, supra note
31, Rule 1.6 (duty to protect client confidences); id. Rule 4.1(b) (duty to protect cli-
ent confidences supersedes duty of truthfulness to others).
284. See supra note 273.
285. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (prohibiting practitioners from signing returns
reflecting positions that fail to satisfy the "realistic possibility" standard). The pen-
alty imposed on return preparers with respect to undisclosed positions effectively
prevents the preparer from signing a return containing an undisclosed position that
fails to satisfy the "realistic possibility" standard. See I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1994); Treas.
Reg. § 1.6694-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1992). Although Formal Opinion 85-352 does
not directly address the ethical obligations of the lawyer serving as return preparer,
the Task Force Report issued concurrently with the opinion deals with the issue:
To avoid conflict with obligations imposed upon tax return preparers, the
lawyer should first determine whether the position meets the ethical
[realistic possibility of success) standard. If not, the lawyer must counsel the
taxpayer not to assert the position, and, unless this advice is accepted by the
client, the lawyer may not prepare the return, and pursuant to Rule 1.16(a)
must withdraw from further representation involving advice as to the posi-
tion taken on the return. Only if the position meets the standard may the
lawyer prepare the return, sign it, and present it to the client.
Task Force Report, supra note 112, at 639. A preparer who refuses to sign a return
may nevertheless be subject to a penalty as a "nonsigning preparer" if the preparer
completed a substantial portion of the return before withdrawal. See I.R.C. §
7701(a)(36)(A) (person preparing a substantial portion of a return qualifies as an
"income tax return preparer"); Treas. Reg. § 1.7701-15(b) (as amended in 1980)
(discussing "substantial preparation"). To provide nonsigning preparers with an op-
portunity to avoid the penalty, the regulations consider the disclosure requirement
satisfied if the preparer advises the taxpayer that the position lacks substantial
authority and therefore may subject the taxpayer to the substantial understatement
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serving as tax return advisors rarely confront an opportunity to
withdraw-indeed, these practitioners may never learn of a client's
decision to withhold information from the IRS because the en-
gagement ends before the client files the return. The remaining
role-taxpayer representative during the return examination proc-
ess-presents a more difficult question: must the lawyer withdraw
when the taxpayer refuses to supplement a deficient return by vol-
untarily disclosing information during the audit.
The ABA Model Rules require a lawyer to withdraw from an
engagement when continued representation will result in a viola-
tion of the ethics rules or other law.26 In most cases client miscon-
duct does not trigger mandatory withdrawal.2 In fact, the Model
Rules actually contemplate that representation may continue pro-
vided the lawyer does not further the improper purpose pursued
by the client. Nevertheless, the lawyer's continued presence as
counsel can serve to confirm in the minds of others that a client is
advancing a position with "clean hands." Certainly, counsel's
presence during the audit of a return lends credibility to taxpayer
positions, especially if the lawyer has established with IRS repre-
sentatives a reputation for truthfulness and respect for both the in-
ternal revenue laws and the rules governing the conduct of tax
practitioners. Thus, continued representation of a client who re-
fuses to comply with the taxpayer disclosure standard may mislead
the IRS, thereby violating the ethical duty of candor and fairness.
The ethical duty of candor and fairness was first described in
the 1908 Canons of Ethics: "It is unprofessional and dishonorable
penalty. See id. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1992); see also Notice 90-20,
1990-1 C.B. 328, 331 (IRS is not currently imposing the § 6694 penalty on nonsigning
preparers); cf MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 7-25 (lawyer may not sign a pleading
if not in compliance with law).
286. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.16(a)(1); cf. MODEL CODE, supra
note 5, DR 2-110(B)(2) (mentioning only violation of ethics rules).
287. Withdrawal is a permitted response to client misconduct. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 31, Rule 1.16(b)(1) (client's illegal or fraudulent conduct); id. Rule
1.16(b)(3) (client's repugnant or imprudent conduct).
288. See also id. Rule 1.2 cmt. 7.
When the client's course of action has already begun and is continuing, the
lawyer's responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is not permitted to
reveal the client's wrongdoing, except where permitted by Rule 1.6. How-
ever, the lawyer is required to avoid furthering the purpose, for example, by
suggesting how it might be concealed. A lawyer may not continue assisting
a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposes is legally proper but
then discovers is criminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal from the representa-
tion, therefore, may be required.
[Vol. 30:693
TAXPAYER REPRESENTATION
to deal other than candidly with the facts in taking the statements
of witnesses, in drawing affidavits and other documents, and in the
presentation of causes." 9 This duty-now incorporated in the
"dishonesty rule" of the ABA Model Rules29 -was interpreted by
the ABA Ethics Committee in Formal Opinion 314 as imposing on
tax lawyers "a duty not to mislead the IRS deliberately, through
misstatement or silence, or by permitting the client to mislead."2' a
The Committee's interpretation clearly contemplates action on the
part of lawyers representing clients who mislead the IRS by failing
to discloseY.2  But the high level of candor demanded by the dis-
honesty rule cannot be met by a lawyer whose response is limited
to a disclosure recommendation that proves unacceptable to the
client.293 Rather, lawyers must respond by withdrawing as counsel
for any taxpayer who insists on withholding information from the
289. ABA CANONS OF ETHIcs, Canon 22 (1908).
290. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 8A(c) ("It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepre-
sentation); cf MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 1-102(A)(4); see also Peter R. Jarvis
& Bradley F. Tellam, The Dishonesty Rule-A Rule With a Future, 74 OR. L. REv.
665, 669 (stating that the dishonesty rule-DR 1-102-is "substantially equivalent to,
but somewhat broader than, Canon 22" (citing the ABA Comm. on ABA Formal
Opinion 337 (1974))).
291. Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672; see also Formal Op. 85-352, supra note
111, at 633 (citing MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(3),
(5); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rules 4.1, 8A(c)); New York City Bar Report, su-
pra note 57, at 876 ("[Tax lawyers] owe a duty of candor to the revenue agent and
other Service personnel.") (citing the ABA Comm. on ABA Formal Opinion 346
(1982)).
292. See Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 98 ("Failure to disclose a
position inconsistent with the lawyer's reasoned legal judgment (or prediction of suc-
cess if litigated) would be misrepresentation."); Holden, Constraining, supra note
261, at 774 ("If it is established that a taxpayer does indeed have a normative, Code-
imposed 'must' duty to disclose positions lacking substantial authority, then one can
accept rather easily the proposition that the adviser has an ethical duty to advise
disclosure and perhaps a responsibility to withdraw from rendering advice with re-
spect to the return in question if that advice is not accepted."); cf Jarvis & Tellam,
supra note 290, at 669 (lawyer's failure to disclose facts that might be necessary to
avoid misleading another violates dishonesty rule (citing the ABA Comm. on ABA
Formal Opinion 337 (1974))). Given the nature and purpose of the disclosure stan-
dard proposed above-to minimize the misleading effects of undisclosed return po-
sitions-a taxpayer's refusal to disclose should be treated as presumptively mislead-
ing. Cf id. at 673 ("[T]he threshold for potential detrimental reliance under the
dishonesty rule was clearly set at a very low level." (citing the ABA Comm. on ABA
Informal Opinion 84-1507) (emphasis added)).
293. Cf. MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.2 cmt. 7 (continued representation
of those who reject advice from counsel is permitted as long as the lawyer does not
participate in client misconduct).
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IRS.294 A lawyer who fails to terminate an engagement under
these circumstances permits the client to mislead the IRS and
thereby violates the dishonesty rule.2 5 Thus, lawyers confronted
with a client who insists on limiting disclosure of information must
withdraw to avoid violation of the dishonesty rule; indeed, because
continued representation will trigger the dishonesty rule, with-
drawal is mandated by the Model Rules.9  Inclusion in the Rules
294. In general, a lawyer is required to withdraw from an engagement if continued
representation would result in a violation of the ethics rules or other laws. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-110(B); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule
1.16(a)(1). In addition, withdrawal is permitted in a variety of circumstances, includ-
ing situations in which the client insists on a course of action the lawyer believes to
be criminal or fraudulent or that the lawyer believes to be repugnant or imprudent.
See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-110(C); MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule
1.16(b)(1), (3). Formal Opinion 314 contemplates that withdrawal may be the only
course of action available to the lawyer whose continued representation of a client
may mislead the IRS:
The difficult problem arises where the client has in fact misled but without
the lawyer's knowledge or participation. In that situation, upon discovery
of the misrepresentation, the lawyer must advise the client to correct the
statement; if the client refuses, the lawyer's obligation depends on all the
circumstances. Fundamentally, subject to the restrictions of the attorney-
client privilege imposed by Canon 37, the lawyer may have the duty to
withdraw from the matter. If for example, under all the circumstances, the
lawyer believes that the service relies on him as corroborating statements of
his client which he knows to be false, then he is under a duty to disassociate
himself from any such reliance unless it is obvious that the very act of disas-
sociation would have the effect of violating Canon 37. Even then, however,
if a direct question is put to the lawyer, he must at least advise the service
that he is not in a position to answer.
Formal Op. 314, supra note 98, at 672; cf. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-.101 (establishing that an
attorney may be subject to disciplinary proceedings if that attorney knows of and al-
lows violation of the IRS regulations by a client). It is interesting to note that the
Canons of Ethics upon which Formal Opinion 314 was based did not address the
question of mandatory withdrawal:
A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients
from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particu-
larly with reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial officers, jurors,
witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer
should terminate their relation.
ABA CANONS OF ETHICS, Canon 16 (1908) (emphasis added).
295. Because counsel for the taxpayer will be aware of the client's refusal to dis-
close and the consequences associated with the refusal to disclose, the failure to re-
spond, either through independent disclosure or withdrawal, makes the lawyer a
party to the misrepresentation in violation of the dishonesty rule. With disclosure
eliminated as an option for the lawyer, withdrawal is the only means available of
avoiding the dishonesty rule.
296. See MODEL RULES, supra note 31, Rule 1.16(a)(1) (requiring withdrawal
whenever continued representation will result in a violation by the lawyer of the
ethics rules or other law); id cmt. 2 (referring to client demand that lawyer engage in
unethical or illegal conduct); cf ABA CANONS OF ETHICS, Canon 16 (mandating
withdrawal if the client persists in wrongdoing against members of the judicial sys-
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of Practice of a mandatory withdrawal provision will ensure that
all tax practitioners are compelled to withdraw from representing
any taxpayer who refuses to comply with the taxpayer disclosure
standard during examination of a return. -
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
If society is sufficiently committed to the importance of an ef-
fective taxing system designed around self-assessment, it must ac-
knowledge that such a system, by its very nature, is a cooperative
effort between taxpayers and the government and that the effec-
tiveness of the system is threatened by taxpayers and tax lawyers
who treat the return preparation and examination process as an
adversarial proceeding in which vigorous advocacy of positions
will produce a winner and a loser. In fact, all taxpayers lose when
an individual assumes an aggressive position on a return and, with
an interest in maximizing the chances of prevailing on the issue,
limits disclosure of the position on the return as a means of pre-
venting detection and the possibility of challenge during an audit.
To the extent that these taxpayers prevail by default on issues the
government would have challenged successfully, the resulting tax
savings enjoyed by one taxpayer becomes an additional burden as-
sumed by the rest of society.298
To be sure, all taxpayers have the right to resolve doubt in
their favor and, when appropriate, to challenge existing law by
taking aggressive return positions. Nevertheless, the right to ad-
vance questionable positions must carry with it the obligation to be
forthcoming with information related to that position sufficient to
ensure that the debate necessary to protect the taxing system will
occur. The taxpayer disclosure standard proposed above will sat-
isfy this objective if taxpayers comply with the standard by ade-
quately disclosing questionable return positions. Unfortunately,
neither the normative nature of the obligation nor the threat of
penalties will assure a favorable response from taxpayers, in large
tern); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-110(B)(2) (requiring the lawyer to withdraw
if continued representation would violate a disciplinary rule).
297. This use of the rules of professional ethics to address the problem of aggres-
sive return positions is the subject of considerable debate. See, e.g., New York State
Bar Ass'n Tax Section, supra note 124, at 1116 (citing New York City Bar Ass'n, 36
TAX LAw. at 882-83).
298. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 62, at 338 ("[S]ome people will
take advantage of their fellow citizens by deliberately understating their own liabili-
ties.").
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part, because the risk of detection is and will remain extremely
low. Consequently, the success of this proposal ultimately depends
on the attitude of taxpayers toward the taxing system. Taxpayers
must share a genuine belief in the importance of taxpayer compli-
ance and the ability of the taxing system to assess and collect the
correct amount of tax from every taxpayer. In addition, the
audit process must be acknowledged by taxpayers as an important
and necessary component of the compliance testing system. Fi-
nally, given that disclosure will significantly increase the likelihood
of audit,300 taxpayers must be assured that the burden shouldered
by audited taxpayers is no greater than absolutely necessary. In-
deed, failure to address taxpayers' perception of audits as experi-
ences to be avoided at all cost will cripple efforts to facilitate a free
exchange of information between taxpayers and their government.
These observations illustrate that enhanced taxpayer disclo-
sure will contribute little to the effort to promote taxpayer compli-
ance if other weaknesses in the compliance testing system do not
receive similar attention. Perhaps the most important of these in-
volves the conduct of IRS personnel. The government must join
with taxpayers and tax practitioners in accepting responsibility for
the adversarial nature of the return preparation and examination
process. °1 The overzealous behavior of examining agents and
other IRS personnel encourages an adversarial response from tax-
payers and their representatives. In addition, the aggressive and at
times condescending approach toward taxpayers taken by some at
the IRS explains the agency's tarnished image3 9 as well as the need
299. See id. at 351 ("The weight of research evidence also suggests that percep-
tions of the fairness of the tax system affect the compliance decisions of taxpayers,
particularly among those with high opportunity." (citations omitted)).
300. This assumes that all supplemental information disclosed by taxpayers will be
considered by the IRS, an assumption that is, at best, optimistic. Apart from the ef-
fect of disclosure on taxpayers, see supra note 79, both the ability and willingness of
the IRS to evaluate the information submitted by taxpayers will have a profound ef-
fect on taxpayer cooperation. See Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 107
(noting possible administrative problems associated with IRS review of information
provided through enhanced disclosure standard); Taxpayer Compliance Report, su-
pra note 66, at 356 (noting that confidence in the system will suffer if information
submitted to the IRS goes unused).
301. Cf. Prop. Rev. to Op. 314, supra note 113, at 71 ("It may be that upon com-
mencement of an audit Internal Revenue Agents take adversarial positions, despite
formal admonitions to operate 'in a fair and impartial manner, with neither a gov-
ernment nor a taxpayer point of view."' (citation omitted)).
302. See Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 62, at 353 (regarding the nega-
tive image of the IRS).
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for recent legislative and administrative action taken for the pur-
pose of establishing and protecting taxpayer rights.3 3 These pro-
tective measures are an important first step, to be sure. However,
taxpayers must also be assured that government representatives
are held to the same high standard of conduct imposed on taxpay-
ers and their representatives and, when appropriate, are penalized
for deviating from that standard. By establishing a standard of
conduct to which all parties are subject, the tax compliance system
becomes less threatening to taxpayers who are then less likely to
perpetuate the current practice of information control in the inter-
est of defending against the overzealous internal revenue agent.
Finally, consider the role of the lawyer as advisor, return pre-
parer, and taxpayer representative and the impact that this pro-
posal will have on the adversarial representation of taxpayers. Tax
lawyers must recommend disclosure whenever disclosure is man-
dated by the taxpayer disclosure standard and must disassociate
themselves from clients who refuse to adopt such advice. Admit-
tedly, characterization of the taxpayer disclosure standard as
"normative" changes the way in which lawyers approach the ques-
tion of disclosure-encouraging taxpayers to withhold information
on questionable return positions is an option available only when
disclosure is truly voluntary. But forcing lawyers to withdraw
when a client refuses to disclose represents a more fundamental
change in the nature of taxpayer representation that undoubtedly
will prompt concern over the right to representation and the im-
pact of self-representation on the tax compliance system.l Never-
theless, this change in the traditional approach to taxpayer repre-
sentation naturally follows from the taxpayer's normative duty to
disclose and the nature and importance of the tax compliance sys-
tem.
The complexity of the internal revenue laws, the volume of re-
turns filed by taxpayers each year, and the limited ability of the
IRS to audit returns for compliance combine to form a compliance
testing system that is forced to rely on private practitioners for as-
sistance in promoting taxpayer compliance. Tax lawyers are
303. See supra note 234.
304. See Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 98 ("[H]aving either to
withdraw from representing a client pursuing a right of access to the Tax Court or to
prejudice the client's position in subsequent litigation, impinges on the rights of the
client who is entitled to the assistance of counsel in minimizing tax liability within the
bounds of the law."); Harris, supra note 248, at 527 (requiring withdrawal would re-
strict access to representation).
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bound to represent their clients zealously within the bounds of the
law but must also be mindful of the overriding societal importance
of taxpayer compliance and the effect that traditional partisan rep-
resentation can have on IRS efforts to select and audit returns.
The resulting compromise prevents lawyers from using all means
available to secure client objectives but only to the extent that in-
formation control is no longer a weapon available for use against
the IRS. Once the taxpayer satisfies the disclosure requirement,
counsel is free to advocate on behalf of taxpayer positions;... in-
deed, adequate disclosure of return positions justifies the lawyer's
use of partisan advocacy in negotiations with the IRS by address-
ing the issue of party inequality and thereby allowing the lawyer to
focus on the objectives of the client, confident that a partisan pres-
entation of the client's position will not prevent the IRS from pro-
tecting the interests of the government.
Taxpayers and their representatives must join with the IRS in
a cooperative effort designed to promote taxpayer compliance.
Taxpayers must acknowledge the importance of the compliance
testing system and the government's need for information that
only the taxpayer can provide."' Tax practitioners must respect
their dual responsibility-duties to both clients and the system-
and must be prepared to put the good of the system ahead of client
loyalty when clients refuse to disclose 3 7 Finally, compliance test-
305. See Handelman, Constraining, supra note 109, at 93 ("Disclosure can pre-
serve the client's rights, without permitting an adviser unilaterally to define law
along the contours of the client's interest."); see also supra note 175 and accompany-
ing text (noting that once the disclosure requirement is satisfied, advocates may ar-
gue on behalf of client).
306. Taxpayer education is an essential part of this process. See Taxpayer Com-
pliance Report, supra note 62, at 332 (noting the importance of efforts dedicated to
educating taxpayers on the importance of compliance); id. at 354 ("To improve tax-
payers' cooperation with the Internal Revenue Service and increase their willingness
to comply, we recommend that the IRS take a more active role in educating taxpay-
ers and providing assistance to those who need it.").
307. See Darrell, supra note 93, at 38 ("[I]t may be thought that this obligation of
the lawyer should be at least as, if not more, strict and rigid when he is facing the
Treasury, the thought here being that a tax matter is not simply a matter between
taxpayer and Treasury but between taxpayer and Treasury and other taxpayers.");
Maguire, supra note 92, at 44 ("The private lawyer in a tax controversy realizes that
on the other side are his Government and the community of which he is a mem-
ber."); Taxpayer Compliance Report, supra note 62, at 354 (acknowledging the dual
responsibility of tax practitioners: to promote taxpayer compliance and to advance
client interests). In contrast, Oatway states:
It is quite probable that most practitioners when faced with such an oppor-
tunity to make a contribution to the effective operation of the tax system
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ing must be designed and administered by the government in a
manner that encourages the cooperative behavior that, in the end,
will determine whether the IRS succeeds in its mission to promote
taxpayer compliance.
turn in the right direction. But they probably do so in response to their own
citizenship and moral consciousness rather than in response to a clearly
enunciated professional responsibility.
Oatway, supra note 92, at 247.
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